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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 23, 2015, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and summarily disposed of Al Maqaleh v. Hagel.1 This short,
unremarkable order brought an end to almost a decade of litigation on
behalf of detainees at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. This order has
significant and potentially dangerous consequences. It leaves in place
a D.C. Circuit precedent that effectively permits the Executive to determine how far and to whom the writ of habeas corpus will reach.
The Al Maqaleh litigation consolidated several habeas corpus petitions filed on behalf of Bagram detainees. It began in 2006 when petitioner Fadi al Maqaleh filed a writ of habeas corpus.2 Al Maqaleh is a
Yemeni citizen who alleged that he was captured outside Afghanistan
in 2003.3 Other petitioners’ cases were later consolidated with this
petition. These include the cases of Redha al Najar, a Tunisian citizen, who alleges capture in Pakistan, and Amin al Bakri, a Yemeni
citizen, who claims he was arrested while on a business trip to Thailand.4 Both allege that they were captured in 2002,5 and they filed
habeas corpus petitions in 2008.6 Significantly, all three detainees
claimed they were captured outside Afghanistan—away from any battlefield—and had been extraordinarily rendered to Bagram to face indefinite and prolonged detention.7
The U.S. Government moved to dismiss these petitions for lack of
jurisdiction under the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA).8 In
1. Al Najar v. Carter, 135 S. Ct. 1581 (2015), vacating as moot 738 F.3d 312 (D.C.
Cir. 2013).
2. Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh I), 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209 (D.D.C. 2009).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. Extraordinary rendition is a doctrine under which the President claims inherent authority to capture and transfer individuals to third countries to face
interrogation and, in some cases, torture. See Louis Fisher, Extraordinary Rendition: The Price of Secrecy, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1405, 1406 (2008); Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1336 (2007).
8. Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 7(a), Pub. L. No. 109-366 (2006) (“No court,
justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear” a habeas petition seeking the
release “of an alien detained by the United States who has been determined . . . to
have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.”); Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d, at 207. Congress enacted the MCA in
response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
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the 2008 case Boumediene v. Bush, the U.S. Supreme Court held the
MCA unconstitutional for suspending the writ of habeas corpus to detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.9 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion set forth a three-factor test to determine the reach of the
Suspension Clause as applicable to detainees held outside U.S. territory.10 These factors are:
(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process
through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites
of where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical
obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.11

The principal question presented in the Al Maqaleh litigation—
whether the Suspension Clause reached petitioners at Bagram—
turned on the interpretation and application of this three-factor test.
In 2009, Judge John D. Bates of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia issued the first major opinion in Al Maqaleh.12 It focused
on the jurisdictional question as to whether the Suspension Clause
applied to detainees at Bagram. Concluding that the Bagram petitioners “are virtually identical” to detainees in Guantanamo under the
Boumediene factors, Judge Bates dismissed the government’s motion
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.13 In May 2010, a three-judge panel
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit unanimously reversed.14 Then-Chief Judge David B. Sentelle interpreted
the second factor (site of apprehension and detention) and the third
(practical obstacles) “overwhelmingly in favor” of the United States to
dismiss the petitions.15 The petitioners then returned to the District
Court to present amended petitions containing new evidence that they
argued would tip the Boumediene analysis in their favor.16 The District Court, bound by the D.C. Circuit’s decision, construed the
Boumediene factors narrowly and dismissed the amended petitions.17
The D.C. Circuit upheld this decision in (another) unanimous opinion

9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

(2006), which held that the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 did not apply to cases pending before Article III courts.
The MCA retroactively applied these DTA provisions to all pending cases. See
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 738 (2008) (“[T]he MCA was a direct response
to Hamdan’s holding that the DTA’s jurisdiction-stripping provision had no application to pending cases.”).
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 723.
The Suspension Clause provides, “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety
may require it.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766.
See Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205.
Id. at 208–09.
See Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh II), 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 97–99.
See Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh III), 899 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2012).
Id. at 13.
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authored by Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson.18 Petitioners then filed
a writ of certiorari before the U.S. Supreme Court in August 2014.19
When the justices reached the case, however, none of the petitioners
was in U.S. custody.20 The Supreme Court therefore dismissed their
petitions as moot and vacated the judgment of the D.C. Circuit.21
This Article examines the legal landscape surrounding the extraterritorial reach of the writ of habeas corpus following the Supreme
Court’s disposition of Al Maqaleh. It argues that the two D.C. Circuit
opinions in this case misconstrued Supreme Court precedent and
reached erroneous conclusions. On three issues in particular, the D.C.
Circuit’s legal conclusions are flawed.
First, the court misinterpreted the second Boumediene factor,
which pertains to the site of apprehension and site of detention. Both
D.C. Circuit opinions focus exclusively on the site of detention, ignoring the fact that all three of these detainees claim to have been apprehended outside Afghanistan and extraordinarily rendered to Bagram.
Moreover, the court misread Eisentrager, a 1950 Supreme Court case
considering the writ of habeas corpus in the context of German nationals detained following World War II, and Boumediene to confer primacy on U.S. sovereignty over the detention facility.22 This
marginalizes other aspects of the Boumediene three-factor analysis
such as the objective degree of control over the facility and the indefinite nature of petitioners’ detention.
Second, the D.C. Circuit misconstrued the practical obstacles factor as a separation of powers issue as opposed to a functional concern
with extending the writ to Bagram. Judge Henderson’s opinion for the
D.C. Circuit is especially problematic in this regard.23
Third, and most worrisome, both D.C. Circuit opinions dismiss
(without serious consideration) petitioners’ claim that the Executive
manipulated the site of detention—by choosing to hold petitioners at
Bagram rather than at Guantanamo Bay—to escape the reach of
18. See Al Maqaleh v. Hagel (Al Maqaleh IV), 738 F.3d 312 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
19. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Al Najar v. Carter, 135 S. Ct. 1581 (2015) (No. 146575).
20. See Josh Gerstein, U.S. Sends Two Prisoners to Yemen from Afghanistan, POLITICO (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2014/08/ussends-two-prisoners-to-yemen-from-afghanistan-194510 [https://perma.unl.edu/
T4WH-GHY5]; Sudarshan Raghavan, U.S. Closes Last Detainee Site in Afghanistan as Troop Pullout Advances, WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/united-states-closes-last-detainee-site-in-afghanistan-astroop-pullout-advances/2014/12/11/e238f10a-8140-11e4-9f38-95a187e4c1f7_story
.html [https://perma.unl.edu/YT44-4HTU].
21. See Al Najar v. Carter, 135 S. Ct. 1581 (2015), vacating as moot 738 F.3d 312
(D.C. Cir. 2013).
22. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S.
763 (1950).
23. See Al Maqaleh IV, 738 F.3d at 329–35.
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habeas corpus.24 A Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on the
CIA’s detention and interrogation program published in December
2014 subsequently confirmed that senior officials in the Bush Administration ordered detainee transfers specifically to avoid habeas jurisdiction.25 For these reasons, this Article argues that it is crucial that
Al Maqaleh be abrogated. Al Maqaleh should not bind future courts
tackling the difficult questions of how far and to whom the writ of
habeas corpus should reach.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part II provides factual background and a detailed summary of the major opinions in the Al
Maqaleh litigation. Part III examines the site of apprehension prong
of the Boumediene factors and argues that it should have played a
more substantial role in the D.C. Circuit’s jurisdictional analysis. It
also critically examines the D.C. Circuit’s formalistic approach to the
site-of-detention factor. Part IV looks at the practical obstacles factor,
tracing its development from Eisentrager through Boumediene. Part
V looks at executive manipulation of writ jurisdiction and explains the
gradual shift from Guantanamo Bay to Bagram Air Base as the principal detention site—a shift motivated, at least in part, by a desire to
evade habeas corpus. The Article concludes that Al Maqaleh has unconstitutionally altered Boumediene’s test for the extraterritorial application of habeas corpus by empowering the Executive to “switch the
Constitution on or off at will.”26
II. AL MAQALEH: BACKGROUND AND
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A.

Facts of the Case

The petitioners in the Al Maqaleh litigation all alleged similar
facts. Fadi al Maqaleh, a citizen of Yemen, was captured outside Afghanistan in approximately 2003.27 Because Bagram detainees did
not have access to counsel, the exact details of his arrest and detention
are not known. Al Maqaleh’s family only discovered that he was in
U.S. custody through the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC).28 In a letter to his father, al Maqaleh stated that he was U.S.
24. See id. at 335–37; Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh II), 605 F.3d 84, 98–99 (D.C.
Cir. 2010).
25. See SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, COMMITTEE STUDY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM (2014)
[hereinafter SCCI REPORT], http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/VK6L-3Q49].
26. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765.
27. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh I), 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209 (D.D.C. 2009).
28. Joint Brief for Petitioners-Appellees at 2, Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (No. 09-5265).
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custody but included no information about his capture.29 Al
Maqaleh’s habeas corpus petition initially alleged only that he was
seized outside Afghan territory.30 Subsequent amended petitions alleged that he was initially detained at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and
transferred to Bagram in 2004 or 2005.31 Al Maqaleh also alleged
that he was detained in one or more CIA “black sites” and subjected to
torture and other forms of cruel, inhumane, and degrading
treatment.32
Redha al Najar, a Tunisian citizen, resided in Karachi, Pakistan
when he was captured in or around May 2002.33 His petition alleges
that plain-clothed Pakistani and French men took him from his home,
in front of his wife and children.34 The petition further alleges that,
following his arrest, al Najar was “disappeared” for approximately one
and a half years.35 In this period, he claims to have been placed in one
or more CIA “black sites” and, like al Maqaleh, subjected to torture
and other unlawful interrogation techniques.36
Amin al Bakri is a Yemeni citizen.37 His petition alleges capture
in Bangkok, Thailand on or around December 30, 2002.38 It further
alleges that he was a precious stones and shrimps merchant on a business trip when he was “disappeared by the United States.”39 Al
Bakri’s fate was unknown to his family until six months after his disappearance. At that time, they received a postcard through the ICRC
in his handwriting informing them that he was detained in Bagram.40
29. Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 5, Al Maqaleh v. Gates
(Al Maqaleh III), 899 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 06-1669).
30. See Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 209.
31. Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 29, at 4. The
U.S. Government contested whether Al Maqaleh was captured outside Afghanistan. It presented sworn declarations from military officials stating that he was
captured in Zabul, Afghanistan. See, e.g., Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 87 (citing a
sworn declaration from Colonel James W. Gray, Commander of Detention
Operations).
32. Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 29 at 4–5. Black
sites were covert prisons established by the CIA in several countries including
Afghanistan. Torture and other interrogation techniques that were illegal under
both U.S. and international law were practiced at these sites. See Layla Nadya
Sadat, Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition under International Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 309, 315 (2006).
33. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 209.
34. First Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus at 4–5, Al Najar v. Obama (D.D.C.
Apr. 4, 2011) (No. 08-2143).
35. Id. at 5.
36. Id.
37. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 209.
38. Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 4, Al Bakri v. Obama, 660 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 08-1307).
39. Id. “Disappeared” in this context refers to extraordinary rendition. See supra
text accompanying note 7.
40. Id. at 4–5.
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In that six-month period, the petition claims that al Bakri suffered
injuries and serious abuse in CIA “black sites.”41
It is worth noting some important similarities among the three petitioners. First, all three allege that they were captured outside Afghanistan, away from any battlefield, and that none of the petitioners
are citizens of Afghanistan. Second, they were all held virtually incommunicado at Bagram. Despite numerous requests from their
U.S.-based attorneys, petitioners were never allowed to meet with or
even speak on the telephone with legal counsel.42 As a result, petitioners’ attorneys never operated with a full account of the factual circumstances surrounding their capture and detention. What little
information emerged about their situation was pieced together from
communications with family members. Through the ICRC, petitioners were periodically allowed to send messages and speak on the
phone with their families.43 Third, and most disturbingly, all these
petitioners claim to have endured torture and other cruel, unusual,
and degrading treatment in contravention of international law both at
CIA “black sites” and at Bagram.44
B.

The Four Major Opinions
1. Al Maqaleh I

In April 2009, Judge Bates of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued the first major decision in the Al Maqaleh
litigation (“Al Maqaleh I”).45 His memorandum opinion ruled on the
Government’s motion to dismiss the consolidated habeas petitions for
lack of jurisdiction. In this procedural posture, petitioners had the
burden of establishing the court’s jurisdiction, but their petitions
would be construed liberally with all factual inferences weighed in
their favor.46 The principal issue for the court was whether the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution applied to detainees at
Bagram Air Base.47
Judge Bates’s opinion begins with a detailed overview of precedents pertaining to the extraterritorial reach of the Suspension
Clause.48 He correctly identified that, in this long line of cases,
41.
42.
43.
44.

45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 5.
See Joint Brief for Petitioners-Appellees, supra note 28, at 5–6.
Id. at 2–5.
See id. at 5 (describing, inter alia, how several detainees have died as a result of
inhumane treatment at U.S. detention facilities around the world while detainees
at Bagram were threatened with dogs, photographed in “shameful and obscene
positions,” and “placed in cages with a hook and a hanging rope from which they
were blindfolded and hung for days.”).
See Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh I), 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009).
Id. at 211.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 214–17.
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Boumediene is unique. As he put it, “[N]o case was so on point as to
allow the [Boumediene] Court simply to apply established precedent.
Instead, the Court constructed a new framework to address the specific question it faced.”49 The specific question in Boumediene, according to Judge Bates, “is no different” from the issue posed in Al
Maqaleh, and therefore “the analysis . . . must focus first and foremost
on Boumediene.”50
In Boumediene, the Supreme Court held that section 7 of the MCA,
which stripped federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas petitions
from detainees at Guantanamo Bay, was an unconstitutional suspension of the writ.51 The court noted, “[A]t least three factors are relevant in determining the reach of the Suspension Clause.”52 Judge
Bates subdivided them into six factors:
(1) the citizenship of the detainee; (2) the status of the detainee; (3) the adequacy of the process through which the status determination was made; (4)
the nature of the site of apprehension; (5) the nature and site of detention; and
(6) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the petitioner’s entitlement to
the writ.53

As a threshold matter, Judge Bates had to decide whether the
Boumediene factors should be applied categorically to all detainees.54
This is what the Government proposed. In its view, for instance, the
site of apprehension factor turned only on whether detainees were
captured in American territory; if they were not, the Court should end
its inquiry and construe that factor in the Government’s favor.55
Judge Bates rejected this categorical approach because, in his view,
“Boumediene contemplated a more nuanced analysis” that focused on
“objective factors and practical concerns.”56 Crucially, he noted that
the Government’s approach could have problematic consequences. It
would allow the executive to “switch the Constitution on or off at will”
and therefore nullify one of the core purposes of the writ—to provide a
judicial check on executive detention practices.57 In this vein, Judge
Bates proposed a seventh factor: the period of detention without adequate review.58 He noted that, as of 2009, petitioners had all been
detained for more than six years and therefore “whatever ‘reasonable
period of time’ the Executive was entitled had long since passed.”59
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 214.
Id.
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 792 (2008).
Id. at 766.
Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 215.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 216 (quoting Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764).
Id. (quoting Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765).
Id.
Id. (quoting Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 795).
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In applying the Boumediene factors, Judge Bates carefully weighed
the competing arguments on both sides. With respect to citizenship,
the fact that none of the petitioners were U.S. citizens weighed
against them, just as it did with the Boumediene petitioners.60 Petitioners argued that the court should further make the distinction between citizens of friendly and belligerent nations.61 Hence, the fact
that petitioners were Yemeni and Tunisian—and not Afghan or
Iraqi—should be construed in their favor. Judge Bates rejected this
approach on the grounds that the Authorization for Use of Military
Force (AUMF) applied to a terrorist “enemy” more broadly (including
organizations or persons) and not to specific nations.62
The “status of the detainee” factor did not clearly favor either
side.63 However, Judge Bates found that petitioners’ “enemy combatant” designation was so broad that it required “meaningful process” to
ensure that they were not improperly classified.64 The process afforded to Bagram detainees at the time was the Unlawful Enemy
Combatant Review Board (UECRB).65 Comprised of three commissioned officers, the UECRB reviewed every detainee’s status within
seventy-five days of capture and every six months thereafter.66 The
United States conceded that the process afforded to Bagram detainees
to challenge their status was less rigorous than the Combatant Status
Review Tribunals (CSRTs) that the Bouemediene Court had found inadequate.67 Some of the most glaring deficiencies included: no legal
representation for detainees (or even access to a “personal representative” as the CSRTs permitted); no opportunity for detainees to testify
in person or to rebut evidence against them; and no supervisory or
appellate body empowered to review UECRB status determinations.68
Thus, Judge Bates concluded that the “adequacy of process” factor
weighed heavily in favor of petitioners—even more heavily than in
Boumediene.69
The site of apprehension factor weighed against petitioners’ entitlement to the writ because petitioners were captured outside the
United States.70 But Judge Bates pointed out a subtle distinction between Guantanamo Bay and Bagram Air Base. While all detainees at
60. Id. at 217–18.
61. Id. at 218.
62. Id.; see Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224, 224 (2001).
63. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 219.
64. Id. at 219–20.
65. Id. at 227.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 220.
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Guantanamo were rendered there from third countries, this was not
the case at Bagram. Located in an active theater of war, Bagram
mostly comprised detainees captured in Afghanistan, many of whom
were Afghan citizens.71 However, the petitioners in this case were
third-country nationals who alleged that they had been rendered to
Bagram from other, non-battlefield locations. Judge Bates noted that
the site of apprehension was therefore more important in this case
than in Boumediene.72 Nonetheless, he concluded that petitioners
could not be materially distinguished from their Boumediene counterparts, as they were all captured outside the United States.73
The site of detention and practical obstacles factors required the
most explanation. Both pertained to the nature of Bagram Air Base
and the American presence there. The site of detention analysis
turned on the “objective degree of control” that the United States exerted over Bagram and the duration of its presence there.74 Specifically, the district court had to determine whether Bagram was more
akin to Guantanamo Bay or Landsberg Prison—the site of detention
at issue in the post-World War II case Johnson v. Eisentrager.75
In Eisentrager, the Supreme Court declined to extend the writ to
21 German nationals imprisoned at an Allied facility in Germany, after a Military Commission in China convicted them.76 The Government consistently argued that Bagram was analogous to Landsberg,
which was jointly controlled by Allied forces and had only existed for
five years when the Court decided Eisentrager.77 By contrast, it
pointed out that the United States had an exclusive lease over Guantanamo Bay for more than 100 years.78 In comparison, as of 2009, the
United States had occupied Bagram for less than a decade and the
Government maintained that it had no long-term interest in maintaining the base.79 Judge Bates agreed with the Government on the
question of duration. However, he found the “objective degree of control” over Bagram was closer to Guantanamo.80 This was based on
subtle, but important, differences in the legal agreements governing
Landsberg and Bagram. At Landsberg, the four Allied representatives (the United States, UK, France, and Soviet Union) had joint con71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 220–21.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 221–22.
Id.
See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 790–91 (1950).
Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 33–38, Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh II),
605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 09-5265).
78. Id. at 32.
79. Id. at 33–34; Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 224–25.
80. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 224–25.
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trol over the facility, and any action required unanimous consent.81
The lease governing Bagram, however, gave the United States exclusive control over the premises.82 This exclusive control extended to
the Bagram Theater Internment Facility where petitioners were
held.83 Thus, the United States, not its allies, detained individuals at
Bagram and did not require the approval or consent of any other country in its decision making with respect to detainees.
The final factor for Judge Bates to consider was “practical obstacles inherent in resolving . . . [petitioners’] entitlement to the writ.”84
Boumediene specifically contemplated that this factor would weigh
more strongly in the Government’s favor if detainees were housed
within an active theater of war.85 However, as Judge Bates observed,
the petitioners in Eisentrager received a “rigorous adversarial process
to test the legality of their detention” in China following the Japanese
surrender in 1945.86 If this was possible in the aftermath of World
War II, it “strains credulity” to believe that a similar process would
not be possible in a secure American military base.87
The Government raised two further “practical” concerns: (1) that
gathering evidence and providing access to counsel would prove difficult in a war zone; and (2) that extending the writ to petitioners would
cause friction with the Afghan government.88 On the first point,
Judge Bates conceded that Eisentrager had been concerned about the
practical difficulties of producing petitioners in the United States for
habeas corpus proceedings.89 However, he stated that technological
advances such as “real-time video-conferencing” would obviate the
need to physically produce petitioners in an American courtroom.90 In
addition, he noted that because petitioners were apprehended outside
Afghanistan, much of the evidence would be located in third-countries,
away from hostilities.91
81. Id. at 223–24.
82. Id. at 224; Accommodation Consignment Agreement for Lands and Facilities at
Bagram Airfield ¶ 9, U.S.-Afg., Sept. 26, 2006, DACA-AED-5-06-6559 (stating
that “the United States shall have exclusive, peaceable, undisturbed and uninterrupted possession” of Bagram Airfield).
83. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 224. Detainees were transferred to a larger
facility known as the Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP) in late 2009. It was
also located within Bagram Airfield. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh III),
899 F. Supp. 2d 10, 17 n.2 (D.D.C. 2012).
84. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008).
85. Id. at 770.
86. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 228.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 228–29.
89. Id. at 228.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 228–29.
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On the second point, Judge Bates simply pointed out that al
Maqaleh, al Najar and al Bakri are not citizens of Afghanistan, meaning that no Afghan court had jurisdiction to hear their cases and that
they would not be transferred to Afghan custody.92 Thus, it was unlikely that habeas proceedings for these detainees would create tension with Afghan authorities.93 Judge Bates ended his discussion of
this factor with an important observation: “The only reason these petitioners are in an active theater of war is because respondents brought
them there.”94 This echoes the concern voiced earlier in the opinion
regarding the Executive’s ability to manipulate or evade writ jurisdiction “merely by deciding who will be held where.”95
On balance, Judge Bates found that when the Boumediene factors
were applied to Al Maqaleh, they weighed in petitioners’ favor.96
Finding no adequate legislative substitute for habeas corpus, the court
held MCA section 7(a), the habeas-stripping provision, unconstitutional and denied the Government’s motion to dismiss with respect to
these three petitioners.97
2.

Al Maqaleh II

The United States appealed the judgment in Al Maqaleh I to the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. A panel comprised of then-Chief Judge
Sentelle, Judge Tatel, and Judge Edwards heard arguments in January 2010 and issued its decision in May (Al Maqaleh II). The judgment reviewed the relevant precedents on the extraterritorial
application of the writ,98 highlighting Boumediene’s rejection of formalism or any bright-line test in favor of an approach based on “objective factors and practical concerns.”99 The court noted, however, that
there must be a limiting principle to prevent the writ from extending
to any United States military facility in the world. As Judge Sentelle
put it, “the petitioners seem to be arguing that the fact of United
States control of Bagram under the lease of a military base is sufficient to trigger [extraterritorial application] . . . we reject this extreme
understanding.”100
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 230.
Id.
Id. at 230–31.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 231–32.
Id. at 235. Haji Wazir, an Afghan citizen, was also a petitioner in this consolidated litigation. Judge Bates declined to hold MCA section 7(a) unconstitutional
in his case, citing the possibility of friction with Afghanistan if the Suspension
Clause was extended to him. See id. at 230, 235; Military Commissions Act of
2006 § 7(a), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635–36 (2006).
98. Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh II), 605 F.3d 84, 88–94 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
99. Id. at 93.
100. Id. at 95.
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The Court then turned to the Boumediene factors. On the first factor—the citizenship, status, and the adequacy of the process used to
determine that status—the court found in favor of petitioners. Judge
Sentelle, echoing the district court, noted that as enemy aliens, petitioners were no differently situated from Guantanamo detainees in
terms of citizenship and status.101 The court also found that the Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review Board (UECRB) process provided
less rights protection than the Combatant Status Review Tribunals
(CSRTs) at Guantanamo.102 Thus, the first factor weighed in favor of
petitioners’ entitlement to the writ.
On the second factor, the D.C. Circuit departed from the district
court’s analysis. Judge Sentelle’s opinion for the court found that both
the site of apprehension and site of detention weighed “heavily in
favor of the United States.”103 He stated that all three petitioners
were apprehended outside American territory, placing them in a similar position to the petitioners in Boumediene.104 But, in his view, the
site of detention at Bagram differed markedly from Guantanamo Bay.
For Judge Sentelle, the fact that the leasehold on Bagram was not
“permanent” in the way the United States had exclusive control over
Guantanamo for over 100 years, coupled with the lack of hostility from
the “host country” (Afghanistan), defeated any claim of American de
facto sovereignty over Bagram.105 His opinion therefore concluded
that Bagram was more analogous to Landsberg Prison—the site of detention in Eisentrager.106
The third factor—practical obstacles—tipped the D.C. Circuit’s
analysis “overwhelmingly in favor” of the Government.107 Relying
heavily on Eisentrager, Judge Sentelle stressed that Bagram was located in an active theater of war, where judicial review would “hamper
the war effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy.”108 Indeed, the
ongoing hostilities close to Bagram heightened these concerns. Eisentrager was decided in 1950, five years after World War II, when
threats were limited to “the possibility of unrest and guerilla warfare.”109 An additional practical obstacle was created by “the fact that
the detention is within the sovereign territory of another nation.”110
According to Judge Sentelle, petitioners’ exercise of habeas jurisdic101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 95–96.
at 96.

at 97.

at 98 (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950)).
at 99.
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tion might disrupt the United States–Afghanistan relationship, which
further supported the Government’s position.111
The final part of Judge Sentelle’s analysis addressed petitioners’
claim that the Executive sought to evade judicial review by detaining
them in an active theater of war. He dismissed this argument as
“speculation” that required no determination from the court.112 Recall that petitioners had been detained in Bagram since 2002 or 2003,
while Boumediene, which extended the writ to Guantanamo, was decided in 2008. Thus, Judge Sentelle pointed out that if military commanders or other officials chose to “turn off the Constitution” with
respect to petitioners, they would have had to predict the outcome in
Boumediene long before it was decided.113
For these reasons, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court and
dismissed all three petitions for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners requested a rehearing en banc, citing new evidence that undermined the
Al Maqaleh II judgment.114 The D.C. Circuit denied the petition for
rehearing, but clarified that this denial was “without prejudice to [petitioners’] ability to present this evidence to the district court in the
first instance.”115
3.

Al Maqaleh III

Petitioners responded to this order by submitting amended habeas
corpus petitions in the district court that included newly discovered
evidence. The case once again came before Judge Bates, who issued a
short opinion in October 2012 (“Al Maqaleh III”). The D.C. Circuit’s
judgment limited the scope of the inquiry—the question presented to
the District Court was “whether petitioners’ new evidence undermines
the rationale of the court of appeals’ decision.”116
Petitioners presented new evidence in three areas to shift the D.C.
Circuit’s Boumediene factor analysis in their favor. First, they submitted documents to show that the U.S. Government intended to
maintain a long-term presence at Bagram.117 This pertained to the
second Boumediene factor—the site of detention. Al Maqaleh II had
concluded that the American presence in Bagram was more akin to
Landsberg than Guantanamo—temporary and likely to end shortly after hostilities ceased.118 Petitioners argued that even though the U.S.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id. at 98–99.
Id. at 99.
Per Curiam Order Denying Petition for Rehearing, Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al
Maqaleh II), 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 09-5265).
Id.
Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh III), 899 F. Supp. 2d 10, 13 (D.D.C. 2012).
Id. at 16.
Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 96–97.
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Government had started to transfer Afghan detainees to Afghan custody, it had no specific plans to transfer non-Afghan detainees.119 Petitioners contended this was evidence of American intent to detain
them indefinitely. Judge Bates dismissed this argument as “mak[ing]
little sense.”120 In his view, this evidence could be read to imply the
opposite—that by transferring some detainees, the U.S. Government
was demonstrating a good faith effort to eventually transfer (or release) all remaining detainees.121
Second, petitioners sought to demonstrate that the practical obstacles involved in extending the writ to them were not as formidable as
the D.C. Circuit had concluded. Shortly after Al Maqaleh II, the Afghan government began conducting trials for Afghan detainees.122
While the U.S. Government argued that Afghan authorities solely conducted these trials, Judge Bates found that the U.S. Government facilitated the process by permitting detainees in American custody to
stand trial and by “mentoring the Afghan participants.”123 However,
he also found that such trials had no bearing on whether the U.S. Government could conduct habeas proceedings. For one thing, full-blown
trials conducted—not merely mentored—by the U.S. government
would divert more resources from the battlefield,124 presenting another “practical obstacle” to habeas proceedings. Further, Americanled trials might carry greater security risks and, if conflicts emerged
between the judiciary and military, it would be “highly comforting to
enemies of the United States.”125
Third, petitioners presented new evidence of executive manipulation or evasion of habeas jurisdiction. Citing declarations from former
U.S. officials, government documents, and newspaper articles, petitioners argued that detainee transfers from Bagram to Guantanamo
decreased sharply following Rasul v. Bush, decided in 2004.126 Moreover, a “reverse flow” of detainees—from Guantanamo to Bagram—was
initiated after Rasul for the purpose of evading writ jurisdiction.127
Judge Bates dismissed these allegations of executive manipulation.
He pointed out, among other things, that Rasul was not a bright-line
and that detainees were transferred from Bagram to Guantanamo af119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Al Maqaleh III, 899 F. Supp. 2d at 17–18.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 98).
Id. at 21–22; see also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that the existing habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, entitled Guantanamo detainees to
challenge the validity of their detention in federal court).
127. Al Maqaleh III, 899 F. Supp. 2d at 21.
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ter the decision was issued.128 As for the fact that detainee numbers
had increased at Bagram, Judge Bates noted the proximity of Bagram
to conflict zones as well as the “international publicity and criticism
surrounding Guantanamo” that would make Bagram a more logical
detention site.129 Judge Bates also reiterated the D.C. Circuit’s concern that petitioners’ argument had no limiting principle.130 If the
writ were extended to Bagram, it would potentially create “universal
habeas jurisdiction, a result far beyond what Boumediene
contemplated.”131
Since this new evidence did not tip the Boumediene factor analysis
in petitioners’ favor, Judge Bates dismissed their habeas petitions for
lack of jurisdiction.
4.

Al Maqaleh IV

Petitioners appealed this ruling to the D.C. Circuit. A three-judge
panel—this time comprised of Judges Henderson, Griffith and Williams—heard arguments in September 2013 and issued a judgment in
December (“Al Maqaleh IV”).132 Judge Henderson’s majority opinion
hews closely to Al Maqaleh II and III. She framed the question before
the court in very narrow terms: “to determine whether the circumstances underlying Al Maqaleh II have changed so drastically that we
must revisit it.”133 The ensuing Boumediene factor analysis covered
much of the same ground as past opinions, with a few notable
exceptions.
The court’s analysis of the first factor—citizenship, status and the
adequacy of process—reiterated much of what Judge Sentelle found in
Al Maqaleh II.134 The fact that petitioners were aliens and detained
pursuant to “enemy combatant” status left them similarly situated to
petitioners in Boumediene.135 However, Judge Henderson noted that
the “adequacy of process” prong did not weigh as strongly in petitioners’ favor as it had in Al Maqaleh II because of procedural improvements at Bagram.136 The combatant review (UECRB) proceedings
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 23.
This judgment also considered whether the writ would extend to two additional
detainees at Bagram: Amanatullah and Hamidullah. Because the facts underlying these detainees’ petitions are significantly different and raise separate legal
issues, these petitions are beyond the scope of this paper. See Al Maqaleh v.
Hagel (Al Maqaleh IV), 738 F.3d 312, 319–323 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
Id. at 321.
Id. at 323–24; Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh II), 605 F.3d 84, 95–96 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
Al Maqaleh IV, 738 F.3d at 323.
Id. at 326–27.
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had been replaced with Detainee Review Boards (DRBs),137 a process
that permitted detainees to consult with a “personal representative”
(who did not necessarily have legal training), call witnesses, submit
evidence, and examine exculpatory evidence.138 Since these minimal
protections did not exist within the UECRB process, the court held
that this factor weighed less in petitioners’ favor than it did in Al
Maqaleh II.139
On the second factor—the site of apprehension and detention—the
court’s analysis centered on the nature and potential duration of
American control over Bagram. The court relied on two documents to
conclude that the United States had no intention to maintain a longterm presence at Bagram. First, it cited the 2012 Memorandum of
Understanding between the United States and Afghan governments,
which provided for the transfer of all Afghan detainees to Afghan custody.140 According to the U.S. Government, this transfer was completed in mid-2013.141 Second, the court relied on the Enduring
Strategic Partnership Agreement (ESPA) between the two governments, which would permit U.S. forces to use Afghan military facilities until 2014.142 Petitioners argued that even if Afghan detainees
were transferred to Afghan authorities, the U.S. Government intended to detain non-Afghan detainees beyond 2014.143 The court dismissed this argument as inapposite. As Judge Henderson put it,
“[t]he indefiniteness of the United States’s control over the place of
detention, not over the prisoners, is the relevant issue.”144
Judge Henderson’s analysis placed the most emphasis on the practical obstacles factor. She reiterated many of the concerns that
animated the Al Maqaleh II judgment,145 including the fact that
Bagram is located in an active theater of war and the prospect of
habeas corpus trials undermining the prestige and authority of military commanders.146 However, her opinion ventured further than Al
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 326.
Id. at 327.
Id.
Id. at 328.
See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., PROGRESS TOWARD SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN 139 (July 2013) [hereinafter DOD REPORT JULY 2013], http://www.defense
.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Section_1230_Report_July_2013.pdf [https://per
ma.unl.edu/R65G-2ASN] (reporting that a 2013 MOU between the U.S. and Afghan governments provided for the transfer of all detainee operations at Bagram
to Afghanistan, and that this transfer was completed on March 25, 2013).
Al Maqaleh IV, 738 F.3d at 328–29; Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement
(ESPA), U.S.-Afg., May 2, 2012 (T.I.A.S. No. 12,702).
Al Maqaleh IV, 738 F.3d at 328–29.
Id.
See Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh II), 605 F.3d 84, 97–98 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Al Maqaleh IV, 738 F.3d at 329–30 (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S.
763, 779, 784 (1950)).
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Maqaleh II to discuss separation of powers concerns. Stressing that
the “President alone conducts the nation’s foreign policy” and that the
conduct of foreign relations is “largely immune from judicial inquiry or
interference,” Judge Henderson effectively ruled that the court lacked
the constitutional authority and institutional wherewithal to question
the political branches with respect to detention policy.147 In this vein,
she dismissed petitioners’ claims of executive manipulation of writ jurisdiction, finding it “utterly incredible” that the President could have
predicted Boumediene in advance and chosen to detain individuals at
Bagram, rather than at Guantanamo, as a result.148 Al Maqaleh IV
therefore dismissed the amended petitions for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court in August 2014. However, none of the petitioners was in
U.S. custody when the justices reached the case in March 2015. More
specifically, al Maqaleh and al Bakri had been transferred to Yemeni
authorities, while al Najar was in Afghan custody.149 For that reason,
the Supreme Court dismissed the case as moot and vacated the judgment of the D.C. Circuit.150
The Supreme Court’s dismissal of this case leaves Al Maqaleh IV
as the final word on the extraterritorial reach of the writ. As I argue
in the following sections, this is a troubling development, for it curtails detainee access to U.S. courts to an extent far greater than
Boumediene anticipated.
III. REVISITING THE SITE OF APPREHENSION
AND SITE OF DETENTION FACTORS
The D.C. Circuit in Al Maqaleh misconstrues the second
Boumediene factor: “the nature of the sites of where apprehension and
then detention took place.”151 By misreading Boumediene and Eisentrager and not accounting for subtle factual peculiarities of Bagram,
both D.C. Circuit opinions, Al Maqaleh II and Al Maqaleh IV, make
the site of apprehension practically irrelevant, while construing the
site of detention too formalistically.
A.

Site of Apprehension

On the site of apprehension, neither Judge Sentelle nor Judge
Henderson grapples with petitioners’ claim that they were apprehended outside Afghanistan and extraordinarily rendered to Bagram.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 333–35 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 335.
See supra note 20.
Al Najar v. Carter, 135 S. Ct. 1581 (2015), vacating as moot 738 F.3d 312 (D.C.
Cir. 2013).
151. Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh II), 605 F.3d 84, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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Judge Henderson’s opinion in Al Maqaleh IV does not even mention
the site of apprehension in its analysis.152 In Al Maqaleh II, Judge
Sentelle’s opinion for the court simply stated that petitioners were apprehended outside the United States, which placed them in the same
position as detainees at Guantanamo.153
This finding elides an important distinction between the two facilities. Whereas detainees at Guantanamo were all captured outside
Cuba, Bagram was located in an active theater of war and therefore
mostly housed individuals captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan.154 Petitioners were therefore exceptional at Bagram in a sense
that they would not be at Guantanamo—they were captured outside
Afghan territory and away from hostilities. This is significant for two
reasons.
First, it raises further doubts about petitioners’ status. As Judge
Bates noted in Al Maqaleh I, the Supreme Court did not provide much
guidance on the “status” prong of the first Boumediene factor.155 As in
Boumediene, the Al Maqaleh petitioners were designated “enemy combatants”—a broad designation referring to individuals who were “part
of, or supporting, forces, engaged in hostilities” against the United
States or its allies.156 The breadth of this definition, coupled with the
fact that petitioners challenged their status, led Judge Bates to stress
the need for “meaningful process” to guard against wrongful classification.157 He then concluded that the existing UECRB review process
was inadequate, as it provided even fewer protections than the flawed
CSRT procedures at issue in Boumediene.158 The D.C. Circuit in Al
Maqaleh II did not analyze the status factor in any depth, but likewise
concluded that the UECRB process did not pass constitutional
muster.159
However, neither court examined the effect of the site of apprehension on the status of these detainees. Recall that petitioners al Najar
and al Bakri claimed to have been abducted from Pakistan and Thailand, respectively.160 The Government did not dispute these allegations.161 Unlike al Najar and al Bakri, less is known about the
152. See generally Al Maqaleh IV, 738 F.3d 312 (focusing solely on the site of detention
in her analysis of the second Boumediene factor).
153. Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 96.
154. See Tim Golden & Eric Schmitt, A Growing Afghan Prison Rivals Bleak Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/26/international/26bagram.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (reporting that Bagram housed
roughly 450 Afghan detainees and 40 non-Afghan detainees).
155. Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh I), 604 F. Supp. 2d at 219 (D.D.C. 2009).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 219–20.
158. Id. at 226–27.
159. Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh II), 605 F.3d 84, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
160. Id. at 87.
161. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 210.
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location of al Maqaleh’s capture. His original habeas petition alleged
only that he was captured outside Afghanistan,162 while the Government claimed that he was apprehended in Zabul, Afghanistan.163
However, it came to light that al Maqaleh was initially detained at
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq before being transferred to Bagram in 2004
or 2005.164 When petitioners asserted this fact in later briefs, the
Government did not contest it.165 Thus, the “enemy combatant” status for all three petitioners is less credible than it would be for those
captured in Afghanistan during hostilities. Two petitioners, al Najar
and al Bakri, were taken unarmed and far away from hostilities; al
Maqaleh’s site of apprehension remains unclear, but the fact that he
was initially detained at Abu Ghraib strongly suggests that he was
captured outside Afghanistan. Thus, the likelihood that these petitioners were wrongfully captured and detained is higher than it would
be for most detainees at Bagram.
Beyond raising doubts about the petitioners’ status, the apprehension of the petitioners outside Afghanistan—in connection with their
subsequent transfer to Bagram—is also significant because this transfer is probative of U.S. Government intent to evade habeas corpus jurisdiction. If petitioners were captured outside Afghanistan and were
not Afghan citizens, why were they subsequently transferred to
Bagram? One possibility is that by detaining these individuals in an
active theater of war, the Government could hold them indefinitely
beyond the reach of federal courts. Judge Bates raised this concern in
Al Maqaleh I, noting that such rendition “resurrects the same specter
of limitless Executive power the Supreme Court sought to guard
against in Boumediene.”166 Boumediene stated that it would be a
“striking anomaly” to allow the political branches to “switch the Constitution on or off at will” and that the power to determine “what the
law is” remains with the judiciary.167 Here, the U.S. Government
could have chosen to detain petitioners at Guantanamo, but chose instead to house them at Bagram. This decision was likely influenced
by a calculation that the writ would not extend to Bagram because,
among other things, the practical obstacles hindering habeas proceedings in a war zone are far greater.168 This is precisely the scenario
162. Id. at 209.
163. Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 87 (citing a sworn declaration from Colonel James W.
Gray, Commander of Detention Operations).
164. Petitioners’ Opposition to Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Petitions for
Writs of Habeas Corpus at 22, Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d 84 (No. 06-1669).
165. Id.
166. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 220.
167. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008).
168. See Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 231 (weighing the practical obstacles factor
in petitioners’ favor, inter alia, because petitioners were “only in the Afghan thea-
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that Boumediene sought to avoid—one in which political actors manipulate the site of detention to evade constitutional protections.169
The following sections will address practical obstacles and executive manipulation in greater detail, but it is worth noting here the
importance of the site of apprehension in this analysis. If petitioners
were captured during hostilities in Afghanistan, their detention at
Bagram would raise few, if any, concerns of unchecked executive authority to “decide when and where [the Constitution’s] terms
apply.”170
B.

Site of Detention

While the D.C. Circuit mostly neglected the site of apprehension,
both Judge Sentelle and Judge Henderson’s opinions for the court in
Al Maqaleh II and Al Maqaleh IV discussed the site of detention at
length.171 They found that the United States did not exercise sufficient control over Bagram Air Base to justify extending the writ to
detainees there.172 This conclusion rests on three faulty premises: (1)
that Eisentrager makes de facto sovereignty an essential factor in the
Boumediene analysis; (2) that the short duration of the U.S. lease over
Bagram determines the degree of American control over the base; and
(3) that the lack of U.S. intent to maintain a “permanent” presence at
Bagram militates against petitioners.
1.

Is Sovereignty a Necessary Condition for Writ Jurisdiction?
a.

De Facto Sovereignty

In Al Maqaleh II, Judge Sentelle analyzed Eisentrager in great detail to determine whether the writ extends to detainees outside the
sovereign territory of the United States. In fact, Eisentrager arguably
overshadows Boumediene in his opinion. Section II (“the Analysis”) of
the opinion begins with an overview of Eisentrager and then traces its
development as the “governing precedent” on the extraterritorial
reach of the writ.173 Judge Sentelle repeatedly stressed that the Supreme Court has not overruled Eisentrager, as Rasul and Boumediene
explicitly denied doing so.174 Significantly, in both cases, the D.C.

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

ter of war because the United States chose to send them there.”); see also infra
Part V (discussing “executive manipulation of writ jurisdiction”).
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765–66 (“The test for determining the scope of [the
Suspension Clause] must not be subject to manipulation by those whose power it
is designed to restrain.”).
Id. at 765.
Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh II), 605 F.3d 84, 96–97 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Al
Maqaleh v. Hagel (Al Maqaleh IV), 738 F.3d 312, 328–329 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 97; Al Maqaleh IV, 738 F.3d at 328.
See Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 88–94.
Id. at 90, 92.
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Circuit had relied on Eisentrager to deny habeas corpus jurisdiction to
detainees at Guantanamo, only to be reversed by the Supreme
Court.175 Boumediene rejected the D.C. Circuit’s contention that de
jure sovereignty over the detention facility was necessary for entitlement to the writ;176 Justice Kennedy found instead that a “common
thread” uniting the precedents in this area is that “practical concerns,
not formalism” must guide the analysis.177
Judge Sentelle initially stated in Al Maqaleh II that the D.C. Circuit “rejects the proposition” that Boumediene would adopt a “brightline test.”178 However, when the court analyzed the site-of-detention
factor, it effectively imposed a bright-line rule. In his opinion, Judge
Sentelle said that while de facto sovereignty is “not determinative . . . the very fact that it was the subject of much discussion in
Boumediene makes it obvious that it is not without relevance.”179 He
went on to find that “the notion that de facto sovereignty extends to
Bagram is no more real” than it would be for Landsberg Prison in
Eisentrager.180
This move to confer primacy on de facto sovereignty was foreshadowed at oral argument. The U.S. Government had essentially argued
that Boumediene requires de facto (if not de jure) sovereignty as a precondition for habeas corpus. Judge Tatel, during oral argument for Al
Maqaleh II, questioned Government counsel vigorously on this point,
noting that, in his view, Boumediene required balancing of several factors, with no individual factor “being dispositive, one way or the
other.”181 At oral argument, Judge Sentelle then framed a question to
counsel that revealed his position quite clearly:
Judge Sentelle: If the Guantanamo de facto sovereignty factor is sine qua non,
the other factors are added there too, but is it the government’s position that
that is a necessary factor for a habeas [sic] to extend beyond the shores in a
Eisentrager-type situation?
Mr. Katyal: That is correct.182

Later, in an exchange with petitioners’ counsel, Judge Sentelle stated
that other factors in the Boumediene analysis only become relevant
“at a different stage in the analysis” if de facto sovereignty was “sine
qua non.”183
175. See id. at 90–93; see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466 (2004).
176. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 755.
177. See id. at 755–64.
178. Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 93, 95. Judge Sentelle was referring here to the government’s argument that Boumediene required de facto or de jure U.S. sovereignty over the detention facility for detainees to obtain habeas jurisdiction.
179. Id. at 97.
180. Id.
181. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d 84 (No. 09-5265).
182. Id. at 17.
183. Id. at 45.
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Thus, in Al Maqaleh II, Judge Sentelle merely paid lip service to
Boumediene’s practical, functional approach. In practice, he applied
Eisentrager formalistically to deny petitioners access to the writ by
making sovereignty a necessary condition to any extension of jurisdiction.184 This about-face undermines the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Boumediene. There is no analysis in Al Maqaleh II addressing the
sorts of “practical concerns” that animated the Supreme Court’s analysis.185 For instance, the nature of the lease and the objective degree of
the United States’ control over Bagram—which the district court discussed at length in the Al Maqaleh I opinion—are not mentioned at all
in Judge Sentelle’s site of detention analysis.186
I will return to these fact-based determinations shortly, but it is
important to first examine whether Eisentrager, which plays such an
important role in Al Maqaleh II, actually held that the writ cannot be
extended to aliens outside the sovereign territory of the United States.
b.

Eisentrager’s Holding

Eisentrager is factually analogous to Al Maqaleh in some respects.
The German petitioners in that case, too, were aliens detained outside
the de jure territory of the United States.187 However, unlike the Al
Maqaleh petitioners, the Eisentrager petitioners had been tried by a
U.S. Military Commission.188 They were convicted for violating the
laws of war by continuing to engage in hostilities against the United
States after Germany’s surrender.189 The question for the Supreme
Court was whether petitioners should be permitted to challenge the
legality of their “trial, conviction and imprisonment” in federal
court.190
From Judge Sentelle’s analysis in Al Maqaleh II, it appears that
Eisentrager was (1) primarily concerned with extraterritorial jurisdiction and (2) ultimately arrived at the broad conclusion that enemy
aliens detained abroad were categorically denied the writ.191 On
closer inspection, however, neither of these characterizations is
accurate.
184. See Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 96–97.
185. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 793 (2008) (“Practical considerations
and exigent circumstances inform the definition and reach of the law’s writs, including habeas corpus. The cases and our tradition reflect this precept.”).
186. See Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 96–97.
187. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765–66 (1950).
188. Id. at 766.
189. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Eisentrager’s (Forgotten) Merits: Military Jurisdiction
and Collateral Habeas, in THE HIDDEN HISTORIES OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS 193,
197–200 (Kevin Jon Heller & Gerry Simpson eds., 2013) (ebook).
190. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 767.
191. See Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 89 (stating Eisentrager held “the writ was unavailable to the enemy aliens beyond the sovereign territory of the United States.”).
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First, it is not clear that Eisentrager was a jurisdictional holding
per se. Justice Jackson’s majority opinion in Eisentrager purports to
focus on jurisdiction, but delves into the merits of the German petitioners’ claims as well. Indeed, while Parts I and II of the opinion set
forth the relevant jurisdictional precedents and the difficulties of extending the writ to Landsberg prison, respectively,192 Parts III and IV
change course. Part III addresses—and rejects—petitioners’ claim
that they should be immune from military jurisdiction;193 Part IV responds to specific objections to the jurisdiction of the Military Commission in China that tried and convicted petitioners.194
If Eisentrager simply held that federal courts did not have jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ claims, how can we make sense of Parts III
and IV of Justice Jackson’s majority opinion? One answer is that
Eisentrager is really a merits decision that has been misinterpreted as
a jurisdictional one. This is what Stephen Vladeck argues in Eisentrager’s (Forgotten) Merits: Military Jurisdiction and Collateral
Habeas.195 Relying on the case’s “hidden history,” Vladeck shows that
petitioners’ main claim before the Military Commission was that it
lacked jurisdiction to try them.196 According to Vladeck, this remained petitioners’ principal claim throughout the litigation in U.S.
courts, but it was obfuscated by lower court decisions.197 The district
court dismissed the case, holding that Ahrens v. Clark prevented federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over extraterritorial habeas
petitions on statutory grounds.198 This was a misreading of Ahrens,
which explicitly avoided ruling on the extraterritorial application of
habeas corpus.199 Ahrens held that federal law only granted habeas
jurisdiction to courts within a detainee’s “district of confinement.”200
As Vladeck puts it, this is a “choice-of-venue provision for individuals
detained within the United States.”201 Instead of simply reversing
the district court on Ahrens, the D.C. Circuit in Eisentrager relied on
the Suspension Clause to hold that habeas corpus extended to any
prisoner in U.S. custody—even those held outside American territory.202 Thus, the Supreme Court had to focus its attention on this
overbroad D.C. Circuit ruling, which required in-depth discussion of
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 763–81.
See id. at 781–85.
See id. at 785–90.
See Vladeck, supra note 189.
Id. at 195.
See id. at 200–02.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 201; see Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 192 (1948).
Ahrens, 335 U.S. 188, 210 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
Vladeck, supra note 189, at 201.
Id. at 201–02; Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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the jurisdictional limits of the Suspension Clause.203 The Court rejected the D.C. Circuit’s approach, which is why Justice Jackson’s
opinion in Eisentrager is generally cited for the proposition that federal courts lack jurisdiction over aliens detained abroad.204
In Vladeck’s view, a better explanation of Eisentrager—one that
makes sense of Parts III and IV—arises from what was “black-letter
law” in 1950: that collateral attacks of military commission rulings
were limited to “whether the military had properly exercised jurisdiction.”205 In this vein, Justice Jackson in Eisentrager analyzed the
lawfulness of the Military Commission’s jurisdiction in Part IV of his
analysis, drawing from Ex Parte Quirin and In Re Yamashita.206
More specifically, he cited Yamashita for the proposition that “correction [of military commission] errors . . . is not for the courts but for
military authorities . . . we consider here only the lawful power of the
commission to try the petitioner for the offense charged.”207 Part IV
concluded with this statement: “We are unable to find that the petition alleges any fact showing lack of jurisdiction in the military authorities to accuse, try and condemn these prisoners or that they acted
in excess of their lawful powers.”208
Thus, it appears Justice Jackson in Eisentrager reached, and rejected on the merits, the petitioners’ claim that the Military Commission lacked jurisdiction over them. This has important implications
for how courts should read Eisentrager. As Vladeck puts it, “Clearly,
Eisentrager did not mean to foreclose access to habeas corpus for all
non-citizens detained outside the territorial United States.”209
Rather, it appears to simply stand for the proposition that aliens have
no recourse in federal court after conviction by a military commission
that properly exercised jurisdiction abroad.210
Vladeck’s analysis shows quite convincingly that Eisentrager has
been misread in subsequent cases as a jurisdictional, as opposed to a
merits, judgment.211 But even if we read Eisentrager as a primarily
203. Vladeck, supra note 189, at 206.
204. Id. at 194 (citing a number of sources that subscribe to this interpretation of
Eisentrager).
205. Id. at 195.
206. Id. at 207; Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779–80 (1950), see generally In
re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (denying writ of habeas corpus on the grounds
that the military commission that convicted Yamashita was lawfully convened
and had the authority to proceed with the trial); Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1
(1942) (upholding military tribunal’s jurisdiction over German saboteurs).
207. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 786–87 (quoting Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 8).
208. Id. at 790.
209. Vladeck, supra note 189, at 209–10.
210. Id. at 210. But cf. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953) (holding that defendants
may argue in habeas petitions that military tribunals did not fully consider their
constitutional claims).
211. Vladeck, supra note 189, at 194–96.
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jurisdictional decision, it still does not compel the narrow, formalistic
conclusion that enemy aliens detained overseas cannot avail of habeas
corpus. At oral argument in Al Maqaleh II, Judges Tatel and Sentelle
both questioned petitioners’ counsel on the contours of Eisentrager’s
holding.
Judge Tatel: The key of Eisentrager . . . is never in American history has
habeas ever been extended to [enemy aliens detained abroad] . . . Now they
mentioned also that they had been tried before military commissions.
Judge Sentelle: We read [Eisentrager], and [military trials] is in the background there, but that’s not anything that the Court used to turn its decision
on. . . . They said, [the German prisoners] don’t have habeas because they’re
beyond the sovereignty of the United States.212

Justice Jackson’s opinion in Eisentrager, however, repeatedly ties
the petitioners’ status to the fact that they were detained abroad. In
Part I of Eisentrager, following an exhaustive survey of wartime
precedents, Justice Jackson concluded, “[T]he nonresident enemy
alien, especially one who has remained in the service of the enemy, does
not have . . . qualified access to our courts.”213 In Part II of Eisentrager, when applying the law to petitioners, Justice Jackson listed six
factors that obstructed their access to the writ. As he put it:
We must hold that a prisoner of our military authorities is constitutionally
entitled to the writ, even though he (a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been
or resided in the United States; (c) was captured outside of our territory and
there held in military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was tried and convicted
by a Military Commission sitting outside the United States; (e) for offenses
against laws of war committed outside the Unites States; (f) and is at all times
imprisoned outside the United States.214

At first glance, this list of factors seems almost exclusively concerned with the extraterritorial aspects of the Eisentrager petitioners’
case. Five out of the six factors—factor (a) is the exception—concern
the foreign sites of apprehension, detention, laws of war violations,
and the military commission. However, factors (c), (d), and (e) also
pertain to the petitioners’ status. That they were held as prisoners of
war and were tried and convicted for laws of war violations by a military commission are central to Justice Jackson’s analysis.215 In addition, factor (a), that petitioners are enemy aliens, presumes that their
“enemy” status has been determined through an adequate legal process. As Justice Jackson later noted, while courts are open, in limited
instances, to resident aliens “of friendly personal disposition,” this accommodation is not made for enemy aliens.216 And, in Eisentrager,
“these prisoners were actual enemies, active in the hostile service of
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 181, at 32–33.
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 776 (1950) (emphasis added).
Id. at 777.
Id. at 777–78.
Id. at 778.
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an enemy power. There is no fiction about their enmity.”217 In other
words, the Military Commission had clearly determined that petitioners were enemy aliens. Petitioners in Al Maqaleh contested their status as “enemy combatants” and were never given the opportunity to
meaningfully challenge that status.
In contrast, Parts III and IV of the Eisentrager judgment proceed
to show that the Military Commission had the authority to make this
determination,218 lest there was any doubt about the legality of its
exercise of jurisdiction. Thus, even if we were to interpret Eisentrager
as primarily a jurisdictional ruling, it does not condition jurisdiction
solely on the site of detention, while relegating other factors, like the
petitioner’s status and the adequacy of process, to the “background.”219 Rather, these factors are intertwined in Justice Jackson’s
Eisentrager analysis, and together compelled that writ jurisdiction
could not be extended to the German detainees at Landsberg.
2.

Conflating Degree and Duration of Control

The “touchstone” of the site of detention analysis is the “objective
degree of control” exercised by the United States over the detention
facility.220 Boumediene’s functional approach requires a careful examination of the facts surrounding U.S. control over specific military
bases.221 In Al Maqaleh, both the district court in Al Maqaleh I and
court of appeals in Al Maqaleh II framed the issue in relative terms,
seeking to determine if Bagram was more akin to Landsberg Prison or
to Guantanamo Bay.222 In Al Maqaleh I, the district court undertook
this analysis in detail, noting important differences between the lease
agreements that governed Landsberg and Bagram.223 In particular,
Judge Bates stressed that while the Allies jointly controlled operations at Landsberg, the United States exercised sole authority over
the prison facility at Bagram, including over determinations on
whether to detain particular individuals.224 Judge Bates later noted
that the duration of control was also relevant in Boumediene, as in
that case, the United States had exclusive control over Guantanamo
Bay for more than 100 years.225 However, as he pointed out, “the
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id.
See id. at 781–90.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 181, at 33.
Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh I), 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 221 (D.D.C. 2009).
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 768–69 (thoroughly examining the degree
of control exerted by the U.S. over Guantanamo Bay vis-à-vis Landsberg Prison
in Germany).
Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh II), 605 F.3d 84, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Al Maqaleh
I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 221–26.
Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 222–24.
Id. at 223–24.
Id. at 224–25.
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Court must consider future intentions of the United States at Bagram
as well.”226 This is an important aspect of the analysis, especially in
the present-day global war against terrorism, where hostilities might
continue indefinitely.227
The D.C. Circuit, however, rejected this sort of contextual analysis
in Al Maqaleh II. At oral argument, Judge Sentelle refused to acknowledge that the Eisentrager petitioners were under the joint authority of the Allies and therefore not subject to plenary U.S. control.
In comparision, the Al Maqaleh petitioners were subjected to plenary
U.S. control.228 More importantly, Judge Sentelle’s Al Maqaleh II
opinion fails to reference the two lease agreements, much less compare the degree of U.S. control over Landsberg and Bagram.229
Rather, Judge Sentelle simply relied on the fact that the United
States had maintained “total control” over Guantanamo Bay for more
than 100 years in the face of a “hostile” Cuban government.230 He
contrasted this to the short duration of U.S. control over Bagram (approximately eight years at the time) exercised with the consent of Afghan authorities.231 This approach conflates the duration of control
with the much more significant “objective degree of control.”232 It also
fails to account for the potential duration of hostilities going forward.
Because of the diffuse and asymmetric threat posed by terrorism, U.S.
military efforts in Afghanistan had no clear end date.233 Unsurprisingly, U.S. Government briefs before the D.C. Circuit in 2010 do not
mention a date—even a tentative one—by which hostilities might
have ended.234
The D.C. Circuit in Al Maqaleh II therefore erred in treating the
short duration of the U.S. presence at Bagram as essentially dispositive. Both the objective degree of control and the potential for a long226. Id. at 225.
227. Id. (“At Bagram, the United States has declared that it only intends to stay until
the current military operations are concluded and Afghan sovereignty is fully restored . . . That promise may be no more than a distant hope given the indefinite
nature of our global efforts against terrorism.”).
228. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 181, at 34, 46.
229. See generally Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh II), 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
This comparison was an important aspect of Judge Bates’s analysis in Al
Maqaleh I.
230. Id. at 97.
231. Id.
232. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh I), 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 221 (D.D.C. 2009)
(emphasis added).
233. See id. at 225; see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004) (“We recognize that the national security underpinnings of the war on terror, although crucially important, are broad and malleable. As the Government concedes, given
its unconventional nature, the current conflict is unlikely to end with a formal
cease-fire agreement.” (internal citations omitted)).
234. See Brief for Respondents-Appellants, supra note 77.
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term U.S. presence at Bagram should have been given substantial
weight in this analysis.
3.

A “Permanent” U.S. Presence at Bagram

In its Al Maqaleh briefs, the U.S. Government disavowed any intention to remain at Bagram permanently.235 Judge Sentelle took
this assertion at face value, noting in Al Maqaleh II, “there is no indication of any intent to occupy [Bagram Air Base] with permanence.”236 Regardless of the veracity of this claim, it fundamentally
misconstrues the relevant language in Boumediene on this issue. The
majority opinion in Boumediene never used the term “permanent” or
any of its predicates.237 Rather, on four occasions, the judgment refers to the “indefinite” nature of detention.238 For our purposes, the
most relevant uses of the term relate to Eisentrager and the indefiniteness of U.S. control over Landsberg. As Justice Kennedy stated in
Boumediene when comparing the United States’ control over Landsberg, Germany to Guantanamo, “The United States’ control over the
prison in Germany was neither absolute nor indefinite.” He later
noted the United States did not intend to “govern [Landsberg]
indefinitely.”239
The difference between “permanent” and “indefinite” is substantial. Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines permanent as “lasting or
continuing for a very long time or forever: not temporary or changing.”240 In comparison, it defines indefinite as “not certain in amount
or length” or “not clear or certain in meaning or details.”241 In Al
Maqaleh, it is likely true that the United States had no intention to
remain at Bagram permanently. There would surely be no need to
maintain a presence in Afghanistan if hostilities ended. However, this
does not directly bear on the question of whether the U.S. presence at
Bagram—and its detention of petitioners—was indefinite. The fact
that petitioners were held for several years, with no potential date of
release or end of hostilities, strongly suggests that their detention was
indefinite—both in terms of length and the terms under which they
might be released. With respect to the indefinite length of detention,
the Supreme Court warned in Hamdi that the unconventional, fluid
nature of the “war on terror” could result in detention without end. It
stated, “If the Government does not consider this unconventional war
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 33–36.
Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 97.
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
Id. at 768, 788.
Id. at 768.
Definition of Permanent, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/permanent [https://perma.unl.edu/Z6ZF-H8BJ].
241. Definition of Indefinite, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/indefinite [https://perma.unl.edu/KP8B-6UXU].

2016]

THE DIMINISHING REACH OF HABEAS CORPUS

175

won for two generations, and if it maintains during that time that
Hamdi might, if released, rejoin forces fighting against the United
States, then . . . Hamdi’s detention could last for the rest of his life.”242
Recall, also, that Judge Bates in Al Maqaleh I read an extra factor
into Boumediene—the length petitioners’ detention without adequate
process.243 When Al Maqaleh I was released, the petitioners had been
detained for at least six years.244 It is striking that, more than one
year later, the D.C. Circuit in Al Maqaleh II did not mention the
length (or indefiniteness) of petitioners’ detention, nor the duration of
the U.S. presence at Bagram.245 Instead, Al Maqaleh II misconstrued
the underlying language in Boumediene to require U.S. Government
intent to occupy Bagram with “permanence.”246
In Al Maqaleh IV, Judge Henderson similarly misconstrued
Boumediene’s relevant language. In response to petitioners’ claim
that they had been detained indefinitely, she wrote, “The Appellants
misapprehend the import of the [site of detention] factor . . . the indefiniteness of the United States’ control over the place of detention, not
over prisoners, is the relevant issue.”247 As in Al Maqaleh II, this formalistic reading of one of Boumediene belies the interconnectedness of
various aspects of the analysis. While it is true that the site of detention analysis is concerned with U.S. control over Bagram, the fact that
petitioners were held indefinitely for a decade at this point was relevant to the adequacy-of-process prong of the first Boumediene factor.248 In addition, Judge Henderson appears to use “indefinite” and
“permanent” interchangeably in her Al Maqaleh IV opinion. For example, in the next paragraph of her opinion, she reiterated Judge Sentelle’s finding in Al Maqualeh II that the United States “had no
intention of remaining in Afghanistan permanently . . . . We took the
Government at its word.”249
Factual circumstances at Bagram changed significantly between
2010 and 2013. In 2012, the United States and Afghanistan entered
into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that provided for the
transfer of all Afghan detainees and U.S. detention facilities to Afghan
242. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004).
243. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh I), 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 216 (D.D.C. 2009);
see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795 (2008) (“The Executive is entitled
to a reasonable period of time to determine a detainee’s status before a court
entertains that detainee’s habeas corpus petition.”).
244. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 216.
245. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh II), 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
246. Id. at 97.
247. Al Maqaleh v. Hagel (Al Maqaleh IV), 738 F.3d 312, 328 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
248. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797 (“Some of these petitioners have been in custody
for six years with no definitive judicial determination as to the legality of their
detention. Their access to the writ is a necessity to determine the lawfulness of
their status, even if, in the end, they do not obtain the relief they seek.”).
249. Al Maqaleh IV, 738 F.3d at 328 (emphasis added).
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authorities.250 Moreover, the Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement (ESPA) between the two states gave “U.S. forces continued access to and use of Afghan facilities through 2014.”251 While Judge
Henderson’s Al Maqaleh IV opinion conceded that 2014 was not a “sell
by” date, she found that it supported the conclusion reached in Al
Maqaleh II—that there was no indication of U.S. intent to remain at
Bagram “with permanence.”252 As it turned out, the United States
ended formal combat operations in December 2014 and transferred petitioners out of its custody at approximately the same time.253
Thus, in hindsight, Judge Henderson’s conclusion in Al Maqaleh
IV—that the site of detention weighed in favor of the Government—
seems more defensible than it was in Al Maqaleh II, which was decided three years earlier. However, as the final word on the site of
detention analysis, Al Maqaleh IV leaves much to be desired. It not
only repeats and reinforces the error in Al Maqaleh II of confusing
“indefiniteness” with “permanence,” but Judge Henderson’s Al
Maqaleh IV opinion also refused to probe into the U.S. Government’s
assertions that it did not intend to remain in Afghanistan in the long
term.254 Despite the Government’s best intentions, unforeseen circumstances, such as an enemy surge or withdrawal of allied forces,
might have required combat operations to continue long after 2014.255
Additionally, while the U.S. Government had transferred the Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP), its main detention facility, and Afghan
detainees to Afghanistan in 2013, it had not showed any desire to
transfer or release third-country nationals like the Al Maqaleh petitioners. In fact, news reports in this period suggested that such detainees would be held separately in U.S. custody for an unspecified
period.256 These reports, coupled with the fact that petitioners had
250. Id.; see DOD REPORT JULY 2013, supra note 141, at 5.
251. Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement (ESPA), U.S.-Afg., art. III, § 6,
U.S.-Afg., May 2, 2012 (T.I.A.S. No. 12,704).
252. Al Maqaleh IV, 738 F.3d at 329 (quoting Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh II), 605
F.3d 84, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
253. See Raghavan, supra note 20.
254. See Al Maqaleh IV, 738 F.3d at 327–29.
255. In any event, the U.S. maintains a troop presence in Afghanistan and is under
pressure to retain that presence. See Nahal Toosi, Pressure Grows to Keep U.S.
Troops in Afghanistan, POLITICO (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/
2015/10/us-troops-in-afghanistan-pressure-to-keep-214795 [https://perma.unl
.edu/EYQ5-EPS5] (citing an Atlantic Council Report urging the government to
maintain approximately 10,000 American troops in Afghanistan).
256. See, e.g., John Knefel, ‘The Other Guantanamo’: Report Shows Impact of Indefinite Detention, ROLLING STONE (Sept. 11, 2013) http://www.rollingstone.com/polit
ics/news/the-other-guantanamo-report-shows-impact-of-indefinite-detention-201
30911#ixzz2eg2755LI [https://perma.unl.edu/FLG7-CECG] (“Despite handing
over control [of Bagram], however, the U.S. has continued to hold around 60 individuals under a stated law of war authority . . . . All of the U.S.-held detainees at
Bagram are non-Afghans . . . .”); Kevin Sieff, In Afghanistan, a Second Guanta-
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been detained for ten or eleven years, should have given the court in
Al Maqaleh IV pause that the government’s intentions might not have
been as transparent as they claimed. More fundamentally, the judicial role in habeas corpus proceedings is to provide a meaningful check
on potential executive abuses of power, not to “[take] the Government
at its word.”257
IV. WHEN PRACTICAL OBSTABLES BECOME PRACTICALLY
INSURMOUNTABLE
The third Boumediene factor used to determine the bounds of
habeas jurisdiction is “practical obstacles inherent in resolving the
prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.”258 In his discussion of this factor
in Boumediene, Justice Kennedy noted that “[h]abeas corpus proceedings may require expenditure of funds by the government and may
divert the attention of military personnel,” but he made clear that
such concerns are not dispositive.259 He distinguished Eisentrager on
the grounds that American forces in post-war Germany were responsible for an enormous rebuilding effort and faced security threats from
guerilla and residual enemy forces.260 These concerns were not present at Guantanamo.261 Then, as dicta, Justice Kennedy stated, “[I]f
the detention facility were located in an active theater of war, arguments that issuing the writ would be ‘impracticable or anomalous’
would have more weight.”262
In Al Maqaleh II, the D.C. Circuit latched onto this dictum to hold
that the practical obstacles prong “weighs overwhelmingly” in favor of
the United States.263 It drew support from Eisentrager, which discussed the potential harms of extending habeas jurisdiction to a war
zone. These practical obstacles include bringing “aid and comfort to
the enemy” and diminishing “the prestige of our commanders, not only
with enemies but with wavering neutrals.”264 Specifically, such trials

257.

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

namo, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2013) https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-af
ghanistan-a-second-guantanamo/2013/08/04/e33e8658-f53e-11e2-81fa-8e83b3864
c36_story.html [https://perma.unl.edu/B9EA-U5ZQ] (“The Afghan government
this year quietly agreed to allow the United States to continue operating its detention center at Bagram for third-country nationals.”).
Al Maqaleh IV, 738 F.3d at 328; see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765
(2008) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)) (noting that it
would be a “striking anomaly” to allow “Congress and the President . . . [to] say
what the law is.”).
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766.
Id. at 769.
Id. at 769–70.
Id. at 770.
Id.
Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh II), 605 F.3d 84, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 98 (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950)); see also Al
Maqaleh v. Hagel (Al Maqaleh IV), 738 F.3d 312, 329 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting a
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would divert commanders’ attention and resources from the battlefield
and create a conflict between the judiciary and military that would be
“highly comforting to enemies of the United States.”265
A.

Overstated Obstacles in Al Maqaleh: A Closer Inspection
of the Facts

In Al Maqaleh, it is not clear that substantial resources would have
to be diverted from the war effort, nor that the military’s prestige
would be damaged if habeas jurisdiction were extended to petitioners.
Petitioners represented only a tiny fraction of the Bagram detainee
population. Their petitions rested heavily on the fact that they were
third-country nationals who had been extraordinarily rendered to Afghanistan to face detention.266 The vast majority of detainees, however, were Afghan nationals captured during hostilities within
Afghanistan.267 Thus, if habeas were only granted to third-country
nationals like petitioners, the resources required would be
minimal.268
With respect to the “loss of prestige” concern, it is similarly worth
noting that U.S. military forces in Afghanistan did not capture these
detainees.269 Rather, petitioners were all captured outside Afghanistan by unknown agents believed to be working for the United
States.270 Moreover, in Eisentrager, a Military Commission had been
convened to try and convict the German petitioners. In that context,
habeas proceedings in federal court would more likely damage the military’s reputation and create the sort of judiciary–military conflict
that could bring “aid and comfort to the enemy.”271 However, since
the Al Maqaleh petitioners maintain that irregular forces captured

265.
266.
267.
268.

269.
270.
271.

similar passage from Eisentrager and similarly holding that this factor weighed
strongly in the Government’s favor).
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779.
See Joint Brief for Petitioners-Appellees, supra note 28, at 1–4.
See Golden & Schmitt, supra note 154.
See Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh I), 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 229 (D.D.C. 2009)
(“The number of detainees who might be entitled to habeas review also factors
into the analysis of practical obstacles. Petitioners all claim to have been captured outside Afghanistan.”); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 769
(2008) (“Compliance with any judicial process requires some incremental expenditure of resources. Yet civilian courts and the Armed Forces have functioned
alongside each other at various points in our history.”).
See Joint Brief for Petitioners-Appellees at 2-4, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 09-5265).
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 19 at 5–6.
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950).
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them and because a military commission had not convicted them,
these concerns are substantially mitigated in their case.272
This fact-specific analysis is precisely what Judge Bates undertook
in Al Maqaleh I. As he elaborated in great detail, Boumediene’s functional approach requires that the three-factor test be applied on a detainee-specific basis, not categorically to all Bagram detainees.273 He
also made two additional observations as to why the costs of habeas
litigation would not pose serious practical difficulties. First, while
Eisentrager was concerned with how to physically produce the petitioners in the United States for trial, these concerns are “significantly
mitigated today by technological advances,” including video conferencing.274 Second, gathering evidence, including witness testimony,
would not significantly disrupt U.S. operations because these detainees were captured outside Afghanistan.275 Most of the evidence related to their capture and pre-Bagram activity would therefore be
located far away from hostilities.276
Thus, in Al Maqaleh II, the D.C. Circuit could have ruled narrowly
to provide habeas proceedings for only the handful of detainees that fit
petitioners’ description. Such a ruling would not apply to Afghan detainees or those captured during hostilities.277 This would not have
significantly diverted resources from the battlefield nor seriously affected the military’s reputation.
However, Al Maqaleh II rejected this detainee-specific approach for
a categorical one. The opinion does not engage with the peculiar circumstances that gave rise to petitioners’ claim.278 Few resources
would be needed to try third-country nationals, evidence in their cases
would likely be found outside Afghanistan, and the military’s prestige
would not be affected to the degree envisioned in Eisentrager. These
facts play no role in Judge Sentelle’s Al Maqaleh II analysis.279 Instead, he simply focused on the fact that Bagram is located in an active theater and categorically foreclosed habeas jurisdiction to all
detainees by listing obstacles that generally exist in such
situations.280
272. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 19, at 17 (“Petitioners were not
captured on the Afghan battlefield, so their habeas cases do not implicate the
‘prestige of our commanders’ in the Afghan theater.”).
273. See Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 215–16.
274. Id. at 228.
275. Id. at 228–29.
276. Id. at 230.
277. See id. at 235–36 (reserving ruling on the habeas petition of Afghan detainee
Hazi Wazir at that time because, inter alia, of the possibility of friction with the
Afghan government—a practical obstacle).
278. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh II), 605 F.3d 84, 95–98 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
279. See id.
280. Id. at 97; see also Al Maqaleh v. Hagel (Al Maqaleh IV), 738 F.3d 312, 329–31
(D.C. Cir. 2013).
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This is further evidence of the D.C. Circuit’s excessive formalism in
Al Maqaleh II. As with its insistence that the site of detention is sine
qua non for jurisdiction,281 the D.C. Circuit in Al Maqaleh II refused
to acknowledge that the writ could apply to some detainees at Bagram
but not to others. At oral argument for Al Maqaleh II, Judge Sentelle
made this very clear in an exchange with petitioners’ counsel.
Ms. Foster: [This case is] about whether there is jurisdiction over these three
petitioners’ cases. There might not be jurisdiction over everybody at Bagram.
Judge Sentelle: There can’t conceivably be jurisdiction over these three cases
unless there’s jurisdiction at Bagram.282

Under this approach, the D.C. Circuit’s concerns about practical
obstacles are fully realized. If the writ applies to places, not persons,
the costs—both tangible and reputational—are much greater. Indeed,
the practical obstacles analysis in Al Maqaleh II assumes that if the
writ applied to Bagram, it would potentially apply to all detainees
there. This perhaps explains why the Court held that this factor
weighs “overwhelmingly” against extending the writ to Bagram,283
even though, on its face, petitioners’ claim could be limited to a small
number of third-country nationals extraordinarily rendered to
Bagram.284
B.

Practical Obstacles as Separation of Powers Concerns

Al Maqaleh II, the first D.C. Circuit opinion, is flawed in its application of the practical obstacles prong to the facts of this case, and the
D.C. Circuit’s subsequent opinion in Al Maqaleh IV misconstrues the
relevant law as well. Writing for the court in Al Maqaleh IV, Judge
Henderson begins her analysis of this factor by reinforcing Judge Sentelle’s reasoning in Al Maqaleh II. She quotes Justice Kennedy’s dictum in Boumediene that the conclusion might have come out
differently if Guantanamo were located in an active theater of war and
the relevant language in Eisentrager about the potential risks of holding habeas proceedings in post-war Germany.285 In Al Maqaleh IV,
Judge Henderson then deviates from Al Maqaleh II to explain why
separation of powers considerations further limit writ jurisdiction in
war zones.286
When Al Maqaleh IV was decided in December 2013, the legal
landscape at Bagram had changed in important ways since Al
281.
282.
283.
284.

See supra Part III.B.1.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 181, at 53.
Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 97.
See Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh I), 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 231 (D.D.C. 2009)
(“[F]or detainees at Bagram who are not Afghan citizens and who were not captured within Afghanistan, the practical obstacles are not so substantial as to defeat their invocation of the Suspension Clause.”).
285. Al Maqaleh IV, 738 F.3d at 329–32.
286. See id. at 333–35.
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Maqaleh II. One important development was that the United States
had transferred control of the principal detention facility at Bagram
(DFIP) to Afghanistan in March 2013.287 It was renamed the Afghan
National Detention Facility–Parwan, part of the larger Justice Center
in Parwan (JCIP).288 Petitioners were held at a separate facility at
Bagram following this transfer.289 At the Afghan facility, criminal
proceedings had commenced against Afghan detainees.290 The U.S.
assisted in these proceedings by providing guidance to Afghan authorities and aiding in evidence collection. According to petitioners, this
showed that the practical obstacles allegedly obstructing habeas proceedings were overstated. After all, if Afghan criminal trials could be
conducted for thousands of Afghan detainees291 within an active theater of war and with American consent and assistance,292 then a few
habeas trials would not significantly divert the U.S. military’s resources or damage its prestige.
In Al Maqaleh IV, Judge Henderson summarily dismissed this argument. She stated, “[Petitioners] miss Eisentrager’s point. The
question is not whether, in the abstract, U.S. armed forces are capable
of participating in judicial proceedings.”293 Rather, according to
Judge Henderson, the relevant question is whether such proceedings
would divert their attention from, among other things, the “military
offensive abroad.”294 Put otherwise, the JCIP trials are part of the
U.S. military offensive; they serve the broader American objective to
strengthen the Afghan judicial system. Thus, by diverting resources
away from the JCIP trials, habeas proceedings would impair this important military objective.
Al Maqaleh IV’s analysis reads the practical obstacles prong too
formalistically. In the vein of Al Maqaleh II, there is no attempt to
determine the costs associated with holding habeas trials for a few
third-country nationals and how those costs fit within the broader military objectives.295 Moreover, while Eisentrager was concerned about
diverting resources from the battlefield, it was also concerned with the
practical difficulties of holding trials in post-war Germany. As Justice
Kennedy stated in Boumediene, “[T]he [Eisentrager] Court was right
to be concerned about judicial interference with the military’s efforts
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

DOD REPORT JULY 2013, supra note 141, at 5.
Al Maqaleh IV, 738 F.3d at 318.
See Sieff, supra note 256.
See DOD REPORT JULY 2013, supra note 140, at 90.
Id. (stating that JCIP had prosecuted over 3,100 detainees by November 2013).
Al Maqaleh IV, 738 F.3d at 331.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 331–32; Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh II), 605 F.3d 84, 97 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
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to contain enemy elements, guerrilla fighters, and werewolves.”296
The fact that Guantanamo faced no such threats substantially contributed to Justice Kennedy’s conclusion in Boumediene that there
were “few practical barriers to the running of the writ.”297 Thus, in Al
Maqaleh IV, the fact that full-blown criminal trials could take place at
Bagram should have been factored into the practical obstacles analysis. In particular, in Al Maqaleh IV, the D.C. Circuit should have
taken notice of the security situation at Bagram that permitted such
trials to be administered. Even if Justice Center in Parwan trials
were part of the military offensive, the fact that they could be conducted largely without incident suggests that habeas proceedings
could be conducted with fewer security risks than were present in
Eisentrager.
In Al Maqaleh IV, Judge Henderson later ventured beyond this formalistic application of the practical obstacles factor to actually change
the underlying legal test. In rejecting the argument that the Justice
Center in Parwan trials have some bearing on potential habeas litigation, Judge Henderson paid homage to the separation of powers. She
declared, “Whether to devote available military resources to the support of the Afghan criminal justice system or to the pursuit of other
objectives is the President’s choice to make.”298 This, in itself, is innocuous—it merely restates black-letter law; the President is commander-in-chief of the armed forces and speaks with “one voice” in
articulating United States foreign policy.299
However, Judge Henderson proceeded to convert this institutional
prerogative into broad deference towards the President and the political branches on jurisdictional questions. In Al Maqaleh III, petitioners introduced a letter from the chief of staff to the Afghan president
addressed to their counsel.300 It stated that the government of Af296. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 769–70 (2008) (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950)).
297. Id. at 770.
298. Al Maqaleh IV, 738 F.3d at 331.
299. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2097–101 (2015). But cf. Deborah Pearlstein, Constitutionality of Congressional Restrictions on Guantanamo Prisoner
Transfers, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 27, 2015, 1:17 PM) (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 57 S. Ct. 216, 221 (1936)), http://opiniojuris.org/2015/10/27/constitutionality-of-congressional-restrictions-on-guantanamo-prisoner-transfers [https://
perma.unl.edu/JH72-Z4FN] (noting that Zivotofsky calls into question CurtissWright Export Corp., which described “the President as the ‘sole organ’ of the
federal government in the field of international relations . . . .”); Peter Spiro,
Three Quick Thoughts on Zivotofsky, OPINIO JURIS (June 8, 2015, 11:35 AM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2015/06/08/three-quick-thoughts-on-zivotofsky/ [https://per
ma.unl.edu/7V3Q-WQ6Q] (arguing that Zivotofsky scaled back the Executive’s
broad assertions of its own authority).
300. See Declaration of Ramzi Kassem, Exhibit 1: Letter from the Office of the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan (dated September 19, 2012), Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al
Maqaleh III), 899 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 06-1669).
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ghanistan had no desire to keep foreign nationals on its soil and supported these detainees receiving trials “by a competent court.”301 This
letter challenged the Al Maqaleh II finding that habeas proceedings in
“the sovereign territory of another nation” might create “practical difficulties” by disrupting the United States’ relationship with Afghanistan.302 Judge Bates in Al Maqaleh III found that the letter was not
dispositive of Afghan government intent because, among other things,
it was a private letter that did not purport to represent the official
position of the Afghan government.303 In Al Maqaleh IV, Judge Henderson agreed with this factual conclusion, but then reiterated her
separation of powers concerns more strongly. As she put it, “Trying to
divine the letter’s meaning would carry us beyond the bounds of our
authority and into the exclusive province . . . of the Executive.”304
Continuing the analysis in Al Maqaleh IV, Judge Henderson then
introduced issues of institutional competence to buttress this separation-of-powers concern. She noted, for instance, that “[f]oreign affairs
are complicated and require a political adroitness that courts simply
cannot supply.”305 Because of conflicting statements on the Afghan
government’s position on detainee policy—both from within the government and in the media—Judge Henderson concluded that the D.C.
Circuit could not decide what that policy was.306 The risk of getting it
wrong and embarrassing the Executive was too great.307 In response
to petitioners’ argument that the Court was abdicating its constitutional duty by failing to inquire into U.S. government policy, Judge
Henderson reasserted that foreign relations are “exclusively entrusted” to the political branches and should therefore be “largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.”308 She added, “Judicial
inquiry into the President’s detention decisions . . . raises grave concerns about encroachment on the President’s authority.”309
In effect, Al Maqaleh IV inserted the political question doctrine
into the Boumediene factor analysis.310 This fundamentally miscon301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

Id. at 5.
See Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh II), 605 F.3d 84, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Al Maqaleh III, 899 F. Supp. 2d at 20.
Al Maqaleh v. Hagel (Al Maqaleh IV), 738 F.3d 312, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 334.
Id.
See Stephen Vladeck, Two Quick Reflections on Why Al Maqaleh III Matters, JUST
SECURITY (Dec. 24, 2013, 3:03 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/5029/quick-reflections-al-maqaleh-iii-matters [https://perma.unl.edu/QN6Q-DCWX] (“Judge
Henderson all-but expressly invoked the political question doctrine . . . .”). The
political question doctrine is a justiciability doctrine that leaves certain issues—
including foreign policy—for the political branches to resolve. See ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 129 (3d ed. 2006).
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strues Boumediene, which rejected separation of powers formalism in
the context of habeas jurisdiction.311 As discussed, the test for jurisdiction emerging from Boumediene is a practical one.312 The third
prong—practical obstacles—is concerned with precisely what it says,
practical difficulties in extending the writ of habeas corpus. These include concerns with respect to resource allocation, security, and the
military’s prestige.313 Institutional or constitutional concerns, such
as the judiciary’s competence or its proper role in matters of foreign
relations, are not relevant.
Al Maqaleh IV also fails to understand the nature of the political
question doctrine and justiciability concerns generally. Whether a
case presents a “political question” unsuitable for judicial resolution is
a determination on the merits.314 This should not be conflated with
the jurisdictional question of whether the writ of habeas corpus can be
extended to Bagram. Justiciability issues arise only after jurisdiction
has been established.315
By yielding to the political branches at the jurisdictional stage in
Al Maqaleh IV, Judge Henderson essentially gives political leaders a
carte blanche. It appears from her analysis that any Executive invocation of practical difficulties or strained relations with another country is beyond the judicial ken and warrants almost complete
deference. That such deference extends even to questions of jurisdiction—such as whether the Suspension Clause applies to Bagram—allows the political branches, not the judiciary, to determine “what the
law is.”316
V. EXECUTIVE MANIPULATION OF WRIT JURISDICTION
Underlying the writ petitions in Al Maqaleh was the claim that the
Executive chose to detain petitioners at Bagram to evade habeas juris-

311.

312.
313.
314.

315.

316.

For an explanation of the political question doctrine in the habeas context, see
Zachary M. Vaughan, The Reach of the Writ: Boumediene v. Bush and the Political Question Doctrine, 99 GEO. L. J. 869 (2011).
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008) (“Abstaining from questions
involving formal sovereignty and territorial governance is one thing. To hold the
political branches have the power to switch the Constitution on or off at will is
quite another.”).
See id. at 793.
Id. at 769–71.
See generally Gwynne Skinner, Misunderstood, Misconstrued, and Now Clearly
Dead: The “Political Question Doctrine” as a Justiciability Doctrine, 29 J.L. &
POL. 427 (2014) (arguing that lower courts have long misused the political question doctrine to avoid reaching the merits on foreign policy-related questions).
See Vladeck, supra note 310 (noting that Judge Henderson “fundamentally conflates the deference due to the Executive Branch on certain merits questions with
the jurisdictional question of whether the Suspension Clause applies at
Bagram”).
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765 (internal citations omitted).

2016]

THE DIMINISHING REACH OF HABEAS CORPUS

185

diction. This concern does not directly arise from the Boumediene factors per se, but from the broader tenor of Justice Kennedy’s
Boumediene majority opinion.317 If the Executive deliberately chose
Bagram for this purpose, it should tilt the second and third
Boumediene factors in petitioners’ favor. As discussed, this would
most directly impact the site of apprehension and detention factor.318
Since petitioners were neither Afghan nationals nor captured in Afghanistan,319 they could have potentially been detained at Guantanamo and would have therefore been entitled to writ protection. The
practical obstacles factor, too, would weigh less strongly in favor of the
Government if it turned out that petitioners were moved to Bagram
specifically to create the sorts of practical difficulties inherent in an
active theater of war.320
In Al Maqaleh II, the D.C. Circuit conceded that executive manipulation of petitioners’ detention site to evade jurisdiction would factor
into the Boumediene analysis, but declined to find that such evasion
occurred in this case.321 As Judge Sentelle noted, Boumediene’s three
factors were not exhaustive and therefore executive manipulation
“might constitute an additional factor.”322 In Al Maqaleh II, the Court
found petitioners’ arguments on this point to be “unsupported by the
evidence” or “by reason.”323 If the Executive had deliberately chosen
to “turn off the Constitution,” it would have had to anticipate
Boumediene’s outcome long before the case was decided in 2008.324
To be fair, this issue had not been fully briefed in Al Maqaleh II.
Petitioners, in their Joint Brief, focused largely on the enumerated
Boumediene factors, which Al Maqaleh I had construed in their
favor.325 Executive manipulation was only discussed within these factors, with references to Judge Bates’ Al Maqaleh I opinion below.326
However, once Al Maqaleh II declared that evasion of writ jurisdiction
317. See id. at 765 (“The Constitution grants Congress and the President the power to
acquire, dispose of, and govern territory, not the power to decide when and where
its terms apply.”); id. at 766 (noting that the scope of the Suspension Clause
“must not be subject to manipulation by those whose power it is designed to
restrain.”).
318. See supra sections III.A–B.
319. See id.
320. See supra section IV.A; Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh I), 604 F. Supp. 2d 205,
230–31 (D.D.C. 2009) rev’d, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“The only reason these
petitioners are in an active theater of war is because respondents brought them
there.”).
321. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh II), 605 F.3d 84, 98–99 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
322. Id. at 99.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. See Joint Brief for Petitioners-Appellees, supra note 28, at 2.
326. See id. at 25, 34.
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could be an additional factor,327 petitioners presented evidence in subsequent briefs to show that the Executive chose to detain individuals
at Bagram to avoid judicial review.328
A.

Evidence of Manipulation

Petitioners first submitted this evidence of executive manipulation
of writ jurisdiction to the District Court in Al Maqaleh III.329 Their
case for executive manipulation of writ jurisdiction arising out of this
evidence proceeded in three parts. First, they referred to government
memoranda showing that Bagram was not initially intended as a longterm detention facility. A memo from the U.S. State Department in
2002 referred to Bagram as a “temporary collection center where some
detainees stop over en route to their permanent location.”330 This
memo was cited in conjunction with a 2001 memo from the Office of
Legal Counsel, which concluded that the writ would not likely extend
to Guantanamo.331 This memo, authored by Deputy Assistant Attorneys General John Yoo and Patrick Philbin, found that the “great
weight of legal authority” militated against a finding of federal habeas
jurisdiction at Guantanamo, though it conceded that there remained
“some litigation risk that a district court might reach the opposite
result.”332
Second, petitioners cited newspaper articles published from 2006
to 2010 to show that Bagram gradually replaced Guantanamo as the
primary long-term detention facility for “enemy combatants.” For instance, a New York Times article stated that the detainee population
at Bagram had increased six-fold from 2004 to 2005.333 This article
quoted Bush Administration and military officials as saying that this
increase was due, at least in part, to an Administration decision to
“shut off the flow of detainees into Guantánamo after the Supreme
Court [in Rasul v. Bush] ruled that those prisoners had some basic
327. See Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 99.
328. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 09-5265 (D.C. Cir. July 23, 2010) (per curiam) (denying petition for rehearing and allowing petitioners to submit new evidence in
the first instance before the district court).
329. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh III), 899 F. Supp. 2d 10, 12–13 (D.D.C.
2012).
330. Memorandum to the U.S. Deputy Sec’y of State from Gregory Suchan, Acting
Assistant Sec’y for Political–Military Affairs (Jan. 24, 2002), https://www.aclu
.org/sites/default/files/torturefoia/released/t2677_2679.pdf [https://perma.unl
.edu/RUQ9-45KG].
331. Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin & John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorneys Gen., to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Dec. 28,
2001), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/01.12.28.pdf [https://per
ma.unl.edu/RV94-ECTT].
332. Id. at 1.
333. See Golden & Schmitt, supra note 154.
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due-process rights.”334 Another article reported that four high-value
detainees were transferred from Guantanamo to CIA “black sites” in
2003 so that they could be interrogated without access to legal counsel
or to the federal courts.335
Third, petitioners submitted sworn declarations from two former
U.S. government officials: Colonel Lawrence B. Wilkerson and Glenn
Carle.336 Colonel Wilkerson was, inter alia, Chief of Staff to Secretary
of State Colin Powell from 2002–05.337 Colonel Wilkerson confirmed
what the Yoo–Philbin memo suggested—that the “deliberate choice”
to detain individuals at Guantanamo and Bagram in the early 2000s
was “often motivated in significant part by a desire to place detainees
outside the jurisdiction of any legal system.”338 Colonel Wilkerson
further attested that while petitioners were likely taken to Bagram
initially to collect “actionable intelligence” the subsequent decisions to
keep them there “were likely motivated by a desire to evade judicial
review of their detention.”339
Glenn Carle’s declaration introduced a different perspective: the
mistreatment of detainees at Bagram. Carle worked for the CIA for
23 years.340 From November 2003 until his retirement in March
2007, he served as Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Transnational Threats on the National Intelligence Council.341 Much of his
declaration attests to the mistreatment of detainees in U.S. custody
and the wrongful detention of many “innocent civilians.”342 He also
reaffirmed Colonel Wilkerson’s statement that U.S. authorities were
likely attempting to evade judicial review when they chose to detain
petitioners indefinitely at Bagram.343
In Al Maqaleh III, Judge Bates examined this evidence carefully
before ultimately finding it inconclusive. He pointed out that much of
the evidence was not “new.”344 It pertained to executive policy prior to
Al Maqaleh II, and the D.C. Circuit had rejected the argument that
334. Id.
335. See Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, CIA Flight Carried Secret from Gitmo, BOSTON.COM (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/
2010/08/07/ap_exclusive_cia_flight_carried_secret_from_gitmo/?page=2.
336. See Declaration of Ramzi Kassem, Exhibit 2: Declaration of Colonel Lawrence B.
Wilkerson Dated Sept. 22, 2012, Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh III), 899 F.
Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 06-1669) [hereinafter Wilkerson Declaration]; Exhibit 3: Declaration of Glenn Carle Dated Sept. 24, 2012, Al Maqaleh III, 2899 F.
Supp. 2d 10 (No. 06-1669) [hereinafter Carle Declaration].
337. Wilkerson Declaration, supra note 336, at ¶ 1.
338. Id. at ¶ 12.
339. Id. at ¶ 14.
340. Carle Declaration, supra note 336, at ¶ 2.
341. Id.
342. Id. at ¶¶ 8, 11.
343. Id. at 14.
344. Al Maqaleh III, 899 F. Supp. 2d 10, 21.
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the Executive deliberately manipulated the site of detention.345
Moreover, the Government disputed that a “reverse flow” of detainees—from Guantanamo to Bagram—developed following Rasul.346
Judge Bates noted in Al Maqaleh III that some detainees were transferred from Bagram to Guantanamo in September 2004, three months
after Rasul was decided.347 He also stated that the U.S. Government
might have had other motivations to house detainees at Bagram, including proximity to the Middle East and the “international publicity
and criticism” surrounding Guantanamo.348 As for the Colonel Wilkerson and Carle Declarations, Judge Bates found that they were
“largely cumulative of evidence previously submitted” and, in any
event, did not attest specifically to the policy determinations made
with respect to petitioners. In other words, these Declarations were
“really just conjecture.”349
Al Maqaleh IV went further. There, Judge Henderson added gloss
to Al Maqaleh II, suggesting that the D.C. Circuit in that case found it
“utterly incredible” that the Executive could have predicted
Boumediene’s outcome in advance.350 Her opinion held that manipulation could not be read into either the second or third enumerated
Boumediene factors.351 Al Maqaleh IV then explicitly rejected petitioners’ request to create a new factor to account for executive manipulation.352 In keeping with the separation of powers theme, Judge
Henderson stated that “caution must be our watchword” and that “restraint . . . is appropriate” when choosing to expand Boumediene’s
reach, particularly when such expansion would take the Court further
into the “realm of war and foreign policy.”353
Both Al Maqaleh III and IV hold petitioners to an unreasonably
high standard of proof. In Al Maqaleh IV, Judge Henderson dismissed
petitioners’ arguments as speculative, stressing that no piece of evidence showed “that any official ever considered the reach of the writ in
deciding where to detain them.”354 At the district court level in Al
Maqaleh III, Judge Bates went further, stating that under Al Maqaleh
II petitioners effectively needed to show a “smoking gun” to prove executive manipulation.355 Recall, however, that all four major opinions
in the Al Maqaleh litigation were written at the dismissal stage. They
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.

Id.
Id. at 21–22.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 22 n.13.
Al Maqaleh v. Hagel (Al Maqaleh IV), 738 F.3d 312, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
Id. at 335–36.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 336 n.16.
Id. at 336.
Al Magaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh III), 899 F. Supp. 2d 10, 24.
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address U.S. Government motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,356 petitioners have the
burden of establishing jurisdiction, but their petitions should be construed liberally with “the benefit of all favorable inferences that can
be drawn from the alleged facts.”357
Cumulatively, with factual inferences drawn in their favor, petitioners’ evidence strongly suggests that jurisdictional concerns factored into detention policy. The transformation of Bagram from a
temporary collection center to a long-term detention facility corresponded with the Supreme Court’s extension of habeas corpus to
Guantanamo in Rasul.358 To illustrate this transformation, in early
2004, Bagram detained fewer than 100 individuals;359 by 2006, it
housed 630 detainees, compared to 275 at Guantanamo.360 This trend
accelerated after Boumediene was decided in 2008. By 2011, the
Bagram detainee population had swelled to more than 3,000,361 while
the detainee population at Guantanamo had declined to approximately 170 (from a maximum of around 680).362 Much of the expansion at Bagram happened during the Obama Administration, as
Bagram housed only around 600 detainees when President Obama
took office in 2009.363 This data, combined with the 2001 to 2002 government memoranda and the two sworn declarations, is probative of
executive intent to replace Guantanamo with Bagram as the principal
detention facility, at least in part to evade habeas jurisdiction. Even if
there was no “smoking gun” to affirmatively establish a policy of manipulation that specifically targeted petitioners, this evidence should
have sufficed at the motion to dismiss stage. As it turned out, the
evidence was deemed insufficient.

356. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
357. Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh I), 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 211 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir.
1997)).
358. See generally Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (extending the existing habeas corpus statute,
28 U.S.C. § 2241, to Guantanamo detainees).
359. See Golden & Schmitt, supra note 154.
360. See Tim Golden, Foiling U.S. Plan, Prison Expands in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 7, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/07/world/asia/07bagram.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0; The Guantanamo Docket: A History of the Detainee Population, N.Y. TIMES [hereinafter The Guantanamo Docket], http://projects.nytimes
.com/guantanamo [https://perma.unl.edu/L99V-5A8R].
361. See Seth Doane & Phil Hirschkorn, Bagram: The Other Guantanamo?, CBS
NEWS (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/bagram-the-other-guantanamo/ [https://perma.unl.edu/NQX6-DF6L].
362. See The Guantanamo Docket, supra note 360.
363. See Doane & Hirschkorn, supra note 361.
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The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report

Unfortunately for petitioners, the “smoking gun” revealing a systematic government policy to manipulate habeas jurisdiction emerged
too late. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) Study of
the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program
(SCCI Report) was released December 9, 2014, when Al Maqaleh was
under consideration by the Supreme Court.364 The SCCI Report is
best known for exposing the CIA’s unlawful interrogation practices, its
use of “black sites,” and its misrepresentations about these programs.365 Notably though, it also contains important revelations of
the U.S. Government’s manipulation of writ jurisdiction.
Section II(K)(9) of the SCCI Report is titled “U.S. Supreme Court
Action in the Case of Rasul v. Bush Forces Transfer of CIA Detainees
from Guantanamo Bay to Country [redacted].”366 This Section states
that, in early 2004, the U.S. Department of Justice and the CIA discussed the possibility that the Supreme Court in Rasul might grant
five detainees at Guantanamo “habeas corpus rights.”367 After further discussions among the CIA General Counsel, the Department of
Justice, the National Security Council, and the White House Counsel,
these five detainees were transferred from Guantanamo to other CIA
facilities in April 2004.368
The SCCI Report also documents a period in early 2005 in which
the CIA struggled to find suitable detention facilities for detainees in
its custody. In this period, the CIA was looking for an “endgame policy” for its detainees due to “unstable relations with host governments” and problems finding additional host countries. Guantanamo
appears to have been a potential destination for these detainees.369
However, the U.S. Solicitor General cautioned that if detainees were
moved to Guantanamo, they might be entitled to file habeas petitions
and have the right to an attorney.370
This might have been the “smoking gun” that Judge Bates—and
implicitly, Judges Sentelle and Henderson—expected the Al Maqaleh
petitioners to find. While the SCCI Report does not specifically name
petitioners, it conclusively demonstrates that the CIA, the Depart364. See SCCI REPORT, supra note 25.
365. See, e.g., Spencer Ackerman, Senate Report on CIA Torture Claims Spy Agency
Lied about ‘Ineffective’ Program, GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/dec/09/cia-torture-report-released [https://perma.unl.edu/
PCM5-SZT6]; Jeremy Ashkenas et al., 7 Key Points from the C.I.A. Torture Report, N.Y TIMES (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/12/09/
world/cia-torture-report-key-points.html?_r=0.
366. SCCI REPORT, supra note 25, at 140.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 141.
369. Id. at 151.
370. Id.
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ment of Justice, the Solicitor General, and the White House Counsel
were complicit in, or at least aware of, detainee transfers out of Guantanamo to avoid habeas jurisdiction.371
VI. CONCLUSION: THE DIMINISHING REACH OF
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
When it was decided in 2008, Boumediene appeared to be a
landmark judgment. The U.S. Government would no longer be able to
detain individuals without some basic process and the courts would
play a larger role in ensuring that detainee rights were protected.372
However, the legacy of Boumediene has turned out quite differently.
The Supreme Court has not granted certiorari to a single detentionrelated case since that decision.373 In effect, this has ceded exclusive
authority to the D.C. Circuit to oversee U.S. detention policy.374 Since
2008, the D.C. Circuit has construed Boumediene narrowly and in the
Government’s favor.375 Indeed, many of the Circuit’s judges have
openly criticized Boumediene and the Supreme Court’s failure to “assume direct responsibility for [its] . . . consequences.”376
Al Maqaleh fits within this trend of retrenchment following
Boumediene. By interpreting the three-factor test formalistically, and
often rigidly, the D.C. Circuit has effectively limited Boumediene’s
holding to the singular situation at Guantanamo. It appears from its
reasoning in Al Maqaleh II and Al Maqaleh IV that the writ of habeas
corpus will not extend to any detention facility outside U.S. sovereign
control, nor to any facility located in an active theater of war. If sovereignty is sine qua non to writ jurisdiction, and practical obstacles operate as a de facto political question doctrine, then the practical,
functional approach in Boumediene has been lost.377
By choosing to view the extension of habeas to Bagram in all-ornothing terms, the D.C. Circuit essentially predetermined the result
in Al Maqaleh. The D.C. Circuit determined it was unfeasible to ex371. See Stephen Vladeck, The SCCI Torture Report, Rasul, and Transfers to Avoid
Jurisdiction, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 9, 2014, 12:20 PM), https://www.justsecurity
.org/18151/ssci-torture-report-rasul-transfers-avoid-jurisdiction/#more-18151
[https://perma.unl.edu/B7H5-JQV8].
372. See LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: THE ROBERTS COURT
AND THE CONSTITUTION 241 (2014).
373. Id. at 242.
374. See Peter J. Spiro, Sovereigntism’s Twilight, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 307, 318–19
(2013).
375. See generally BENJAMIN WITTES ET AL., THE EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION 2.0:
THE GUANTANAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING (2011) (reviewing the D.C. Circuit’s jurisprudence on habeas at Guantanamo after Boumediene).
376. TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 372, at 242 (quoting Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075,
1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Silberman, J., concurring)).
377. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008) (“[E]xtraterritoriality questions turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism.”).
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tend the writ of habeas corpus to all detainees at Bagram, so it chose
not to extend it to anyone. The fact that petitioners were uniquely
situated as third-country nationals captured away from any battlefield, played practically no role in the analysis.
The D.C. Circuit also did not seriously considers petitioners’ allegations of executive manipulation of writ jurisdiction. Judge Henderson
in Al Maqaleh IV, for instance, dismissed as “utterly incredible” the
notion that the U.S. Government chose to detain individuals at
Bagram rather than Guantanamo to avoid judicial review.378 As a result, the court held that evidence of manipulation would not alter the
analysis of either the second or third Boumediene factors.379
Al Maqaleh IV also refused to create a new, additional factor to
take such manipulation into account.380 Judge Henderson expressed
the concern that, when “[r]educed to its core . . . [petitioners’] argument becomes an appeal for universal extraterritorial application of
the Suspension Clause.”381 This is, of course, not what petitioners requested, but it is the logical result of the D.C. Circuit’s categorical
approach.
Thus, Al Maqaleh IV sets a dangerous precedent if it remains the
last word on the extraterritorial reach of the writ of habeas corpus. Al
Maqaleh IV upheld Al Maqaleh II, which ignored the site of apprehension, misconstrued the site of detention, and overestimated the practical obstacles impeding habeas jurisdiction at Bagram.382 More
problematically, Al Maqaleh IV essentially adopted the political question doctrine—which the Supreme Court in Boumediene explicitly rejected in the habeas context—to defer to government claims that
habeas trials would be impracticable.383 Al Maqaleh IV also refused
to consider evidence of executive manipulation as affecting the
Boumediene factor analysis, even though in Boumediene Justice Kennedy repeatedly expressed concern that such manipulation would distort the separation of powers.384
When the D.C. Circuit or the Supreme Court revisits these issues
in future cases, these courts should question the precedential value of
Al Maqaleh IV, if not overturn it altogether. The Boumediene threefactor test has effectively been replaced by a much more restrictive
test arising out of Al Maqaleh IV: habeas jurisdiction will not be extended to any facility unless (1) it is under de facto U.S. sovereignty
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.

Al Maqaleh v. Hagel (Al Maqaleh IV), 738 F.3d 312, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
Id.
Id. at 336.
Id.
See id. at 327–32; Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh II), 605 F.3d 84, 95–99 (D.C.
Cir. 2010).
383. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 755; Al Maqaleh IV, 738 F.3d at 333–35.
384. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765–66.
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and (2) the Government concedes that there are no serious practical
obstacles to the exercise of the writ. The upshot is that the Executive
can easily evade habeas jurisdiction under the D.C. Circuit’s framework. In a future conflict, the Executive could simply house detainees
close to hostilities or in a facility under a short-term lease agreement
to avoid judicial review of its detention policies. Thus, the Executive
would effectively be empowered to “switch the Constitution on or off at
will.”385

385. Id. at 765.

